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I.

INTRODUCTION

In the 1980s and 1990s, small businesses, large corporations, and
insurance companies began calling for the reform of what they
considered anti-business policies and practices in the U.S. legal system.'
Academic writers likewise started questioning some of the basic tenets
of tort law, applying economic analysis and suggesting that do6trines be
tested and critically examined for their social utility.2 Among the
practices to have come under the most intense scrutiny and criticism is
the award of purportedly excessive punitive damages.' Predictably, the
1. See, e.g., We All Pay the Price:An Industry Effort to Reform Civil Justice, INS. REV.,
Apr. 1986, at 58. Responsibility for tort reform generally and punitive damages reform
specifically is attributed most frequently to the insurance industry. See, e.g., Robert A. Prentice,
Reforming Punitive Damages: The JudicialBargainingConcept, 7 REV. LrTIG. 113, 123 (1988)
(associating purported explosion in litigation and punitive damages with alleged insurance crisis,
orchestrated in part by insurance industry).
2. See Robert L. Rabin, Law for Law's Sake, 105 YALE L.J. 2261, 2261-62 (1996)
(describing functionalist approach under which "tort law is only legitimate if it serves some
useful purpose" by satisfying "independent societal goals"); George L. Priest, Lawyers, Liability,
and Law Reform: Effects on American Economic Growth and Trade Competitiveness, 71 DENV.
U. L. REV. 115, 115 (1993) (noting critics' allegations that expanded liability taxes U.S.
companies and impairs their global competitiveness).
3. Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The HistoricalContinuity of Punitive Damages
Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1269, 1275-76 (1993). The term
"punitive damages" is considered by some to be interchangeable with the terms "vindictive
damages" and "exemplary damages." See Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70
HARV. L. REV. 517, 517 (1957) ('The terms 'punitive,' 'vindictive,' or 'exemplary' damages,
and 'smart-money' have been interchangeably applied to a class of money damages awarded in
tort actions beyond what is needed to 'compensate' the plaintiff for his injuries."). This
interchangeability is imprecise, as punitive damages entail the discrete, distinguishable functions
of vindicating past wrongs and exemplifying them in order to deter future wrongs. Accordingly,
the terms "vindictive" and "exemplary" each represent only one of the two most fundamental
purposes of punitive damages-retribution and deterrence.
The award of punitive damages has been traced as far back as 2000 B.C., as "multiple
damages" exceeding harm to the plaintiff were awarded in Babylon, Greece, Rome and Egypt.
David R. Levy, Note, Punitive Damages in Light of TXO Productions Corp. v. Alliance
Resources Corp., 39 ST. Louis U. L.J. 409, 412 n.20 (1994). The practice of awarding punitive
damages in the United States goes back at least two hundred years. See Coryell v. Colbaugh,
1 N.J.L. 90, 91 (Sup. Ct. 1791) (authorizing jury to award damages both for compensation and
to set an example preventing future infractions). Common law British sources of punitive
damages include Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B. 1763), and Huckle v. Money, 95
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scholars, lawyers, and other commentators who seek to curb punitive
damages encounter resistance from others, such as consumer advocates,
who believe that weakening the force of punitive damages will cause
more harm than good.4 The result of this conflict has been an ideological battle over the utility of punitive damages.
The battle often entails arguments about whether frequency and
amounts of awards have gone out of control.' The discussion frequently
focuses on the problem of outliers-instances in which awards deviate
significantly from the median award among a group of otherwise
comparable cases,6 and therefore presumably deviate also from a just
assessment. In the legal arena, the battle is fought largely in constitutional terms, as judges determine what restrictions, if any, should be
imposed upon awards by such constitutional provisions as the Excessive
Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment 7 or the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.'
This Article, while recognizing the importance of these debates,
suggests that the egregiousness of past and present punitive damage
award abuses, and the status of such abuses under the Constitution, are
of limited importance in our attempts to forge sensible punitive damage
policies.9 Instead of focusing on these debates, the following pages
contain a zero-based examination of some of the most critical questions
concerning punitive damages policy. The emphasis is on understanding
the functions, goals, and purposes of punitive damages, as well as the
Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B. 1763).
4. The reasoning behind this position is predicated on research findings, such as the
observations of Rustad and Koenig that punitive damages usually are "richly deserved," as they
are consistently assessed against defendants with "some prior notice of a developing or known
danger or risk for which they failed to take remedial steps," causing "catastrophic injury or
death." Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, Punitive Damagesin ProductsLiability: A Research
Report, 3 PROD. LIAB. U. 85, 93 (1992).
5. See Michael L. Rustad, Nationalizing Tort Law. The Republican Attack on Women,
Blue Collar Workers and Consumers, 48 RuTGERS L. REV. 673, 694-95 (1996) (citing evidence
that both amounts and frequency of punitive damage awards are reasonable); Michael W. Kier,
Comment, Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd.: Procedural Due Process and An
Arbitrator's Punitive Damage Award, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1085, 1085 (1992) (noting
belief of some that frequency and magnitude of punitive damages have recently increased).
6. See, e.g., David Baldus et al., Improving Judicial Oversight of Jury Damages
Assessments: A Proposal for the Comparative AdditurlRemittitur Review of Awards for
Nonpecuniary Harms and Punitive Damages, 80 IowA L. REv. 1109, 1115-16 (1995).
7. See infra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 99-138 and accompanying text.
9. In other words, the frequency with which the issue of punitive damages is discussed
in terms of constitutional questions is disproportionate to the importance of those questions.
Likewise, the relative frequency of public policy analysis in law review articles is low,
considering how crucial public policy issues are to the punitive damages debate.
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potential negative side-effects. From this vantage, we can forge policies
most likely to benefit society-policies that are consistent with
legitimate goals, fair to the individuals and institutions immediately
affected, and beneficial to the broader communities that may be affected
indirectly.
The analysis begins in Part II, which identifies the major arguments,
both theoretical and practical, that usually are rendered in support of
each side of the punitive damages debate. This discussion is followed
by a brief examination of government responses to the battle over
punitive damages. The observations in this portion of the Article suggest
that opponents have made significant incursions into the size of
acceptable punitive damage awards, and that reform has occurred in
both judicial and legislative arenas.
The remainder of the Article is dedicated to building a normative
framework that addresses one of the most fundamental generic issues
related to reform: the calculation of punitive damages, including any
appropriate constraints upon assessment processes. Part III[ discusses the
purported benefits and functions of punitive damages. We need to
understand and assess the variety of goals behind the institution before
we can begin to make policy recommendations.
Part IV discusses various methods of calculating punitive damages
or criteria that can be used either separately or collectively to determine
awards. These are examined in light of the policy functions and goals
discussed and evaluated in Part I. Part IV includes an assessment of
the various methods and criteria identified, recommending those that
best serve litigants and society in general. The Article concludes with
Part V, which summarizes the observations, findings, and recommendations.
II. POSITIONS OF OPPONENTS AND SUPPORTERS OF PUNITIVE
DAMAGES AND GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO THESE POSITIONS

A. Positions of Opponents
Growing concern over punitive damages can be attributed to a trend
of "significantly larger jury verdicts"'" and an increase in the number

10. Gregory C. Parliman & Rosalie J. Shoeman, Punitive Damages: A Discussion of
Judicialand Legislative Responses to Excessive Jury Awards, 20 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 177, 177

(1994).
Modem punitive damage awards have been increasing since the 1970s. See David G. Owen,
Problems in Assessing Punitive DamagesAgainst Manufacturersof Defective Products, 49 U.

CH. L. REv. 1, 2-6 (1982) (observing growing size of punitive damage awards in late 1970s and
early 1980s). For a review of research showing growth in amounts of punitive damage awards,
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of cases in which punitive damages are sought." Demands for reform
in the area of punitive damages peaked during the Bush administration
years, when Vice President Quayle criticized awards for being capricious and excessive." Ostensibly "skyrocketing"' 3 punitive damage
awards have been cited as the cause of U.S. company failures" and the
source of a competitive disadvantage to U.S. firms in global markets.'5
Growing punitive damage awards also may exacerbate the proliferation
of socially costly' 6 nuisance suits,' 7 through which litigants purportedly intimidate opponents by threatening spurious claims for damages of
menacing proportions.'"
Critics from the law and economics school suggest that punitive
damages yield 9 economic inefficiencies in the form of
"overdeterrence."' They reason that optimally efficient deterrence
occurs when tortfeasors are held accountable for damages that precisely
match the social harms at issue.2" Punitive damages supposedly push
deterrence beyond this optimal level, leading defendants and observers

see Peter Kinzler, Recent Studies of Punitive Damage Awards: The Tale of the Tape, 15 J. INS.
REG. 402 (1997).
11. Bruce Hight, Punitive Awards: Burden on Economy, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Apr.
6, 1994, at El.
12. Dan Quayle, Civil Justice Reform, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 559, 564 (1992).
13. See Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 282 (1989)
(statement by Justice O'Connor, "awards of punitive damages are skyrocketing").
14. Paul J. Baker, Tort Reform Is Answer to Years of Lawsuit Abuse, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, Jan. 9, 1997, at 8A.
15. This competitive disadvantage is a function of increased cost to U.S. firms in areas
such as "insurance premiums, attorney's fees, public relations expenditures, and inspection/product testing." Russell G. Murphy, "Common Sense Legal Reform" and Bell's Toll:
Eliminating Punitive Damage Claims from JurisdictionalAmount Calculations in Federal
Diversity Cases, 84 KY. L.J. 71, 92 n.176 (1995).
16. See Richard G. Bone, Rethinking the "Day in Court" Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion,
67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 193, 197 (1992) (noting high social cost of litigation generally); Adam F.
Ingber, Note, 10b-5 or Not lOb-5?: Are the Current Efforts to Reform Securities Litigation
Misguided?,61 FORDHAM L. REV. 351, 356 (1993) (citing high social costs of frivolous lawsuits
in U.S.).
17. This heading includes litigation labelled "abuse of process." See Timothy P. Getzoff,
Comment, Dazed and Confused in Colorado: The Relationship Among Malicious Prosecution,
Abuse of Process,and the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 675, 676 (1996)
(noting abuse of process concerns regarding "litigants who use legal actions improperly to extort
some benefit, such as money, that is otherwise not warranted").
18. Philip Gold, How Class Action Lawsuits Are Destroying Us, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 29,
1996, at A17.
19. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard R. Posner, New Light on Punitive Damages,
REGISTER, Oct. 1986, at 3.
20. Note, "Common Sense" Legislation: The Birth of Neoclassical Tort Reform, 109
HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1772 (1996).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1997

5

Florida Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 2
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

to exercise levels of care that are "inefficiently high."2 This in turn
creates pricing warps whereby purchasers pay not only for the efficient
risk premium covering accidents expected to result from a product's use,
but also for a super-premium exacted to cover payment of anticipated
punitive darnages.' Some pricing warp allegations target specific
industries-contending, for example, that excessive punitive damages
contribute to the high cost of health care.23
Excessive punitive damages also may impose disproportionately
burdensome costs on U.S. businesses, placing them at a disadvantage
relative to competitors from other nations.2 According to one source,
civil liability in 1995 totalled $161 billion, a figure comprising 2.3% of
gross domestic product, more than twice the average of our competitors
in other nations.' California governor Pete Wilson recently cited this
drain on U.S. business resources in his state-of-the-state speech,
pleading for reform of "a legal system that has made the lawyer's
briefcase a weapon of terror" that threatens the viability of our
economy.26 If punitive damages indeed are excessive given the ends
they seek to achieve, our nation may be paying the cost in terms of
impaired profitability, as well as business lost to global competitors
operating under less threatening legal systems.27
Anxiety over the amount of awards is compounded by suggestions
that calculation of punitive damages is vague and uncertain," arbitrary
and capricious,2 9 particularly in the absence of jury instructions

21. Id.
22. Id. at 1773 n.62.
23. See, e.g., Health Care Priorities,CongressShould Stick to Basic Reforms, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRiB., Aug. 5, 1994, at B6.
24. See Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive
Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1393,
1423 (1994) (tying increased litigation to high economic costs in U.S.); Blake A. Watson,
Liberal Constructionof CERCLA Under the Remedial Purpose Canon: Have the Lower Courts
Taken a Good Thing Too Far?,20 HARV. ENvTL. L. REV. 199, 257-58 (1996) (noting economic
side effects of "excessive litigation").
25. Ruth Gastel, The Liability System, INSURANCE INFO. INST. REP., Jan. 1998, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File.
26. John H. Sullivan, Tort Reform: Unfinished Sacramento Business, BUS. PRESS CAL.,
Jan. 20, 1997, at 23.
27. See Owen, supra note 10, at 6 (raising concern that ostensibly increasing size and
number of punitive damage awards may adversely affect future American businesses).
28. Victor E. Schwartz & Mark A. Behrens, The American Law Institute's Reporters'
Study on EnterpriseResponsibility for PersonalInjury: A Timely Call for Punitive Damages
Reform, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 263, 265 (1993).
29. See Quayle, supra note 12, at 564 (noting punitive damages are calculated in "random
and capricious manner").
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providing adequate standards of guidance." The ostensible result is
awards that vary substantially among comparable cases,31 potentially
creating a degree of instability and uncertainty that raises insurance
costs as institutions try to cover precarious and unpredictable levels of
risk.32 Under this line of reasoning, evidence that many punitive
damage awards are reduced or reversed on appeal fails to placate critics,
who observe that volatility itself adversely affects U.S. businesses
competing against foreign enterprises operating in more stable environments.33 Moreover, the vagueness and uncertainty in punitive damage
awards may have a chilling effect on innovation, as companies fearing
unpredictable punitive damage liability shun or discontinue cutting-edge
projects.3
Philip Howard discusses this phenomenon as a kind of claustrophobia
that punitive damages may inflict on professionals who supplant
optimizing decisionmaking with a search for safe but uninspired
alternatives.35 Excessive awards thus create a culture of risk-averse
cowards who shrink from challenges for decisive action, preferring
instead the safer but stodgier course. Excessive risk aversion could
impair social advancement and economic development, particularly in
fast-paced global markets in which international competitors may feel
freer under less constraining legal systems to pursue bold and ultimately
successful strategies.
Other critics have challenged punitive damages on principled,
philosophical grounds that stand independent of economic arguments.
For example, some have suggested that punitive damages are inappropriate to the civil court venues in which they arise. Under this reasoning,
the civil law system should limit its purview to the ends of compensa-

30. John L. Meredith & Brian P. Casey, Taking Cover: Preserving Error When Hit with
a Claimfor Punitive Damages, 47 BAYLOR L. REV. 923, 942 (1995).
31. Cf. Hiller B. Zobel, Settle, Yes-but the "Punitives," Well... , CHRISTIAN SC.

MONITOR, Oct. 28, 1996, at 19 ("[W]hereas judges imposing fines may be subject to some kind
of legislatively imposed guidelines designed to encourage uniformity, punitive damages vary
with each jury.").
32. See David G. Owen, A Punitive DamagesOverview: Functions,ProblemsandReform,
39 VILL L. REV. 363, 399 (1994) (acknowledging punitive damages as source of increased

insurance costs).
33. See Victor E. Schwartz & Mark A. Behrens, Punitive Damages Reform-State
Legislatures Can and Should Meet the Challenge Issued by the Supreme Court of the United
States in Haslip, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1365, 1371 (1993) ("Vague and uncertain punitive damages
law.., handicaps American businesses in competition with foreign enterprises.").

34. Id. at 1371-72 (citing example of company that stopped working on HIV vaccine due
to fear of "unchecked liability [from sources] such as punitive damages").
35. See Philip K. Howard, Congress Must Reduce Jackpot Theory of Justice in Courts,
CORP.LEGAL TIMEs, Dec. 1995, at 8.
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tion,36 leaving matters of retribution and deterrence to the criminal law
system that was expressly designed and authorized to further these
ends.37
The fairness of a number of practices in the award of punitive
damages also has come into question. Because punitive damages serve
a criminal or at least quasi-criminal function,38 some commentators are
concerned that they are awarded without any of the usual procedural
safeguards that attend criminal trials, including stringent standards of
proof, the right to confront witnesses against oneself, the right to a trial
by jury, and the election against self-incrimination.39 Perhaps most
critically, civil punitive liability evades the traditional requirement that
criminal punishments be restricted to areas "previously defined by
law,140 which presumably ensures the distinct and accurate definition
of punishable offenses.
Likewise, the Constitution's prohibition of double jeopardy may be
a sham if civil juries can exact exorbitant, technically civil penalties
against defendants exonerated in the course of criminal trials. Most
conspicuous in this regard is the civil jury's $33.5 million damage
award against O.J. Simpson in Estate of Goldman v. Simpson42
following Simpson's acquittal in criminal court.43 By what manner of
technical distinction can these severe punitive damages be labelled part
of a civil trial designed to "make plaintiffs whole," rather than a second
attempt to convict the exonerated defendant using the expedient of

36. See Angela P. Harris, Rereading Punitive Damages: Beyond the PublicPrivate
Distinction,40 ALA. L. REv. 1079, 1079-80 (1988) (noting "conventional analysis" of punitive
damages decries extension of tort law beyond compensatory function).
37. Nicole B. Cdsarez, Punitive Damages in Defamation Actions: An Area of Libel Law
Worth Reforming, 32 DUQ. L. REv. 667, 671 (1994).
38. Paul C. Feinberg, FederalIncome Taxation of PunitiveDamagesAwarded in Personal
Injury Actions, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 339, 355 (1992) (noting similarity of criminal fines
and punitive damage awards, except former paid to government and latter paid to private
persons); Paul M. Sykes, Note, Marking a Road to Nowhere? Supreme Court Sets Punitive
Damages Guideposts in BMW v. Gore, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1084, 1085 (1997) (labeling punitive
damages "penal rather than compensatory in nature," and observing that they "introduce a quasicriminal element into civil law proceedings").
39. See generally, e.g., Comment, Criminal Safeguards and the Punitive Damages
Defendant, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 408 (1967).
40. HAROLD J. BERMAN & WILLIAM R. GREINER, THE NATURE AND FUNCTIONS OF LAW
129 (4th ed. 1980).
41. Id. at 125.
42. LRP Pub. No. 192584, Jury Verdict Rsch., Feb. 1997, available in LEXIS, Verdct
Library, Allver File. The award included $8.5 million compensatory damages and $25 million
punitive damages.
43. O.J. Simpson was acquitted of murder charges on October 3, 1995. O.J. Simpson Case
Chronology, UPI DOMESTIC NEWs, Feb. 5, 1997, availablein LEXIS, New Library, Allnws File.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol49/iss2/2

8

Salbu: Developing Rational Punitive Damages Policies: Beyond the Constit
RATIONAL PUNTVE DAMAGFS POUCIES

another trial-one employing a less burdensome standard of proof, and
yet still fundamentally criminal in the punishment it metes out?"
A number of commentators have focused on fairness issues that
relate more to the ways in which our punitive damages system is
implemented than to the ideology behind the institution. Some have
voiced concern regarding a trend to permit arbitrators in certain
industries to assess punitive damages," thereby ceding quasi-criminal
sanctioning power even beyond the civil law's system of judges and
juries. Others have focused on so-called "multiple punitive damages,"46
through which a defendant may be punished redundantly by many
plaintiffs for a single wrongful act.47 The result of this practice may be
the imposition of a cumulative excessive punishment-i.e., a punishment
incommensurately harsh in relation to the severity of the infraction.48
Moreover, multiple punitive damages potentially deny compensation to
some plaintiffs after oppressive punitive damages have been paid to a
number of others, thereby depleting a defendant's resources.49 Despite
such claims of unfairness, multiple punitive damage awards have been
upheld under due process analysis.'
Other commentators have lodged serious challenges to our punitive
damages system based on arguments of social utility. One judge has
questioned the effects of the so-called "jackpot theory of justice,"
through which punitive damage windfalls received by plaintiffs from
institutions like HMOs may ultimately harm the public rather than the
institutions being castigated."1 When exorbitant punitive damages
cripple the institution against which they are assessed, recipients of the
institution's services, in this instance an lIMO's patients, may suffer a

44. For discussion of these concerns regarding the O.J. Simpson civil case, see Nina
Bernstein, Views of a Legal Ordeal, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 5, 1997, at Al.
45. See, e.g., John P. Clearly, FillingMastrobuono's Order: The NASD ArbitrationPolicy
Task Force Ensures the Enforceabilityof Punitive Damages Awards in Securities Arbitration,

52 Bus. LAW. 199, 203 (1996).
46. For detailed discussion of multiple punitive damages, see generally Barbara DiTata,
Multiple Imposition of Punitive Damages, 14 J.PROD. LIAB. 289 (1992).

47. See, e.g., Testimony by Victor Schwartz, Partner Crowell & Moring, Before the
Subcommittee on Courts and Administrative Practice of the Senate Judiciary Committee, May
23, 1994, reprintedin FED. NEws SERv., May 24, 1994.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., Dunn v. HOVIC, I F.3d 1371 (3d Cir. 1993), modified in part, 13 F.3d 58
(3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub nom., Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp. v. Dunn, 510 U.S. 1031
(1993); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Waters, 638 So. 2d 502 (Fla. 1994).
51. See Howard, supra note 35, at 8 (referring to comments of Federal Judge Dickinson

Debevoise).
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loss in quality.52 Even when punitive damages are not so devastating
as to ravage the quality of critical public services, they nonetheless are
likely to be passed on to the public in the form of increased costs
assessed to pay for growing insurance premiums."
B. Positions of Supporters
Claims of excessive, out-of-control punitive damages have been
countered by those who defend the system as it has developed,'M and
by those who believe that the system is not rigorous enough-i.e., that
it contains loopholes that weaken the social functions of punitive
damages.55
Some argue that punitive damage awards are modest 6 and are
awarded relatively infrequently." Perhaps partly in response to highly
publicized abuses, juries in traditionally plaintiff-friendly regions have

52. Id.
53. See Douglas R. Richmond, An Overview of InsuranceBad Faith Law and Litigation,
25 SETON HALL L. REv. 74, 138 n.443 (1994) (suggesting cost of huge punitive damage awards
is passed on to public to cover defendants' raised insurance premiums).
54. See generally, e.g., Rustad & Koenig, supra note 4.
55. Tax deductibility of punitive damages is an example of one such loophole. For critical
discussion of this loophole, see Kimberly A. Pace, The Tax Deductibility of Punitive Damage
Payments: Who Should Ultimately Bear the Burden for Corporate Misconduct?, 47 ALA. L.
REV. 825, 825-27 (1996).
56. See, e.g., Brian T. Beasley, North Carolina'sNew Punitive Damages Statute: Who's
Being Punished,Anyway?, 74 N.C. L. REV. 2174, 2190 (1996) (noting research indicating that
recent punitive damage awards in North Carolina have been "fairly modest").
A schism exists between public perception of huge awards and the reality of more moderate
awards. This discrepancy is encouraged when high-profile excessive jury awards are heavily
publicized. The dramatic reductions in awards that frequently follow as a result of post-judgment
hearings or appeals are less sensational and therefore are likely to receive less press coverage.
The coverage of award reductions that does exist frequently appears in low-profile professional
publications. See, e.g., Frederick Schmitt, Jury Award Against Liberty Nat'l Cutfrom $5 Million
to $37,500, NAT'L UNDERWRrrER, Apr. 7, 1997, at 29 (noting judge-ordered award reduction
during post-judgment hearing). The public is left with inflated notions of the amounts of punitive
damages that are ultimately charged against defendants.
57. See Rustad & Koenig, Demystifying the Functions of Punitive Damages in Products
Liability: An EmpiricalStudy of a QuarterCentury of Verdicts, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 11 (1991)
(stating punitive damages were awarded in only 355 products liability cases between 1965 and
1990); Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Myth and Reality in Punitive Damages,75 MINN. L.
REV. 1, 31 (1990) (observing punitive damages awarded in only 4.9% of 25,627 civil jury
verdicts studied in early 1980s); Richard L. Abel, The Real Tort Crisis-Too Few Claims, 48
OHIO ST. L.J. 443, 459 (1987) (noting infrequency of punitive damage awards). But see Mark
A. Hoffman, Punitive Awards Common in Financial Cases, Bus. INS., June 23, 1997, at 36
(noting punitive damage awards, while generally infrequent, are much more common in financial
injury verdicts).
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begun curtailing the size of personal injury awards." A study published
by the National Center for State Courts found punitive damages awarded
in only six percent of plaintiff victories,59 suggesting that the lamented
frequency of punitive damage awards is exaggerated. Numerous other
studies support the contention that punitive damages are awarded only
infrequently in both personal injury cases and product liability cases.'
Punitive damage supporters suggest that instances of outrageously
high awards are the exception rather than the rule.6 The largest
damages tend to be publicized conspicuously,62 potentially magnifying
and distorting public perceptions that exorbitant awards abound. Even
in regard to the most astronomical awards, such.as the $5 billion in
punitive damages awarded against Exxon over the highly publicized
1989 Valdez spill,63 amounts appearing excessive in absolute terms
may be reasonable considering the egregious nature of the actions being
punished.
Punitive damage supporters also contend that the tort reform
movement of the 1980s has been highly politicized, telling only one side
of the story in an unbalanced, partial rendering." Under this supposition, tort reform reflects the power and influence of business and the
insurance industry rather than real flaws in the legal system." Arguably
missing from the tort reform platform is a recognition of the social
benefits of punitive damages.

58. Mary Flood, To Many Plaintiffs, Texas Juries Add Only Insult to PersonalInjuries,
WALL ST. J., Tex. J. Regional Sec., Mar. 12, 1997, at Ti.
59. See Thomas A. Eaton & Susette M. Talarico, A Profile of Tort Litigation in Georgia
andReflections on Tort Reform, 30 GA. L. REV. 627, 667 (1996) (citing NATIONAL CENTER FOR
STATE COURTS, WORK OF STATE COURTS (1993)).
60. See Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093,
1129-31 (1996) (documenting many studies indicating "low frequency in personal injury cases"
and "low frequency in product liability cases").
61. See Editorial, Sensible Damage Awards, J. COM., Oct. 24, 1991, at 8A ('The image
of ignorant juries frivolously awarding millions of dollars to money-grubbing plaintiffs for slight
harm is supported only by a few high-profile cases.').
62. Kenneth Ross & Kathryn M. Koch, Documenting Manufacturer's Safety Is Way to
Beat Punitive Damages, 11 J. PROD. LIAB. 95, 96 (1988).
63. See In re the Exxon Valdez, No. A89-0095-CV, 1995 WL 527988 (D. Alaska, Jan.
27, 1995). For discussion of this incident and recent judicial activity related to it, see Helen R.
Macleod, Exxon 's Appeal of Valdez DamagesBased on Confidence, Lawyer Says, J. COM., Feb.
18, 1997, at 10A.
64. See Daniels & Martin, supra note 57, at 9-14 (discussing politicization of tort reform
debate, casting movement as social construction of organized, well-financed interest groups).
65. See Sharon G. Burrows, Comment, Apportioninga Piece of a Punitive DamageAward
to the State: Can State Extraction Statutes Be Reconciled with Punitive Damage Goals and the
Takings Clause?, 47 U. MIAMI L. REv. 437, 441 (1992) (suggesting that business's clout with
Reagan administration resulted in "tort reform legislation [that] heavily favors defendants").
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For example, punitive damages can improve the behavior of both
individuals and businesses by supplementing the law enforcement efforts
of district attorneys and attorneys general.' A rigorous punitive
damages system that stretches the limited resources of public officials
arguably encourages the exercise of care on the part of businesses,67
health care institutions,68 and insurance companies.69 Evidence suggests that the majority of defendants who pay punitive damages adopt
some kind of safety measures, presumably influenced at least in part by
the imposition of the penalty.7" Punitive damages likewise discourage
socially reprehensible behavior, such as sexual harassment 7' and sexual
abuse.72
Some who support punitive damages for the role they can play in
creating a better world are activists moving in a direction diametrically
opposed to the activists seeking tort reform. They believe that the
impact of punitive damages needs to be strengthened, not weakened. For

66. See, e.g., Kink v. Combs, 135 N.W.2d 789, 798 (Wis. 1965).
67: One commentator has noted:
Path-breaking scholars and courts have propelled plaintiffs into new theories
not solely to improve the plaintiffs' chances of compensation, but also and
explicitly to alter the behavior of providers of goods and services. Thus courts
are increasingly willing to entertain the idea of punitive damages in products
liability cases, explicitly endorsing relief designed to alter conduct.
Richard L. Marcus, Public Law Litigation and Legal Scholarship,21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 647,
671-72 (1988).
68. See, e.g., Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, Reconceptualizing PunitiveDamages in
Medical Malpractice:TargetingAmoral Corporations,Not "Moral Monsters," 47 RUTGERS L.
REV. 975, 984 (1995) ("[Tlhere is a continuing need for punitive damages to police the understaffing of hospitals, the denial of appropriate treatment because of a patient's inability to pay,
and other types of subordination of the quality of care to the bottom line.").
69. Punitive damage awards against insurance companies are usually related to malice,
fraud, or bad faith in allegedly failing to honor policies. See, e.g., Allyson Quibell, Big Deals,
Big Suits, RECORDER, Feb. 20, 1997, at 5 (reporting California superior court verdict against
Travelers Companies, awarding $1.5 million compensatory damages and $25 million punitive
damages for wrongful breach of insurance contract).
70. George Gray, Informing the Public on the Issues, IND. LAW., Dec. 25, 1996, at 4
(citing Rustad & Koenig, Demystifying the Functions of Punitive Damages in Products Liability:
An Empirical Study of a Quarter Century of Verdicts, EXEC. SUMMARY 11-15 (1991)).
71. Thus punitive damage prospects are an issue in recent sexual harassment charges
against Mitsubishi by as many as 300 women. For discussion of the allegations against
Mitsubishi, see Sharon Krum, Women: The Motor Show, GUARDIAN, Apr. 15, 1996, at T6.
72. The most highly publicized case in this area culminated during the Summer of 1997
in an $18 million punitive damage award against a local Roman Catholic diocese for allegedly
ignoring evidence that one of its priests repeatedly molested altar boys. See Peter Steinfels, $120
Million Damage Award for Sexual Abuse by Priest, N.Y. TIMEs, July 25, 1997, at Al.
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example, some critics challenge the tax deductibility of punitive
damages,7 3 noting that the practice undermines the promotion of
product safety and imposes a portion of the cost of infractions on
taxpayers rather than wrongdoers.74 Opponents to deductibility cite
specific congressional provisions that disallow deduction of various
analogous penalties, such as fines and antitrust treble damages." They
reason that Congress's intent to avoid diluting the impact of these
punishments is applicable to punitive damages.76
Punitive damage supporters also respond to what may be exaggerated
or sensational allegations lodged by critics. For example, Jerry Phillips
defends the award of multiple punitive damages, citing judicial
procedures that can ward off overkill.77 Likewise, respondents can
challenge the notion that punitive damages are driving the proliferation
of nuisance litigation.7" Punitive damages, awarded only for extreme
instances of misconduct, would seem unlikely to encourage nuisance
actions, which by definition are groundless.79 Under this line of
reasoning, the innocent are unlikely to be intimidated into voluntary
compliance with a plaintiff's demands by the implausible threat of
punitive damages associated with entirely baseless litigation.
Finally, commentators have responded to critics' suggestions that the
infliction of punishment through the civil law system is somehow
anomalous. Jane Mallor and Barry Roberts note that some undesirable
activities may not be criminalized, and that punitive damages enable
society to discourage such behaviors.80 Marc Galanter and David Luban
observe that punishment commonly exists as a social institution beyond
the framework of criminal law, and indeed even beyond the framework
of formal legal systems." If punishment is legitimately institutionalized
in settings such as "workplaces, sports leagues, churches, and

73. See Rev. Rul. 80-211, 1980-2 C.B. 57 (stating that punitive damage payments are a
tax-deductible business expense).
74. See Pace, supra note 55, at 825-27.
75. See Catherine M. Del Castillo, Note, ShouldPunitiveDamagesBe Nondeductible? The
Expansion of the Public-PolicyDoctrine, 68 TEX. L. REV. 819, 819 (1990) (referring to I.R.C.
§ 162(0 (1982)).
76. Id.

77. Jerry J. Phillips, Multiple Punitive DamageAwards, 39 ViL. L. REv. 433,438 (1994).
78. See Gold, supra note 18, at A17.
79. Nuisance actions are lawsuits intended to harass defendants. Cf. Waldo v. Journal Co.,
172 N.W.2d 680, 683 (Wis. 1969).
80. Jane Mallor & Barry Roberts, Punitive Damages: Toward a PrincipledApproach, 31

HASTINGS L.J. 639, 644-47 (1980).
81. Marc Galanter &David Luban, PoeticJustice:Punitive DamagesandLegalPluralism,

42 AM. U. L. REV. 1393, 1399 (1993).
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schools,"82 then on what basis can we logically deduce that the
presence of punitive mechanisms in the civil law is somehow inappropriate or insupportable?83
C. Government Responses to the Battle
Over Punitive Damages
Opponents of punitive damages appear to be winning the war, as
governments adopt a variety of reforms that limit awards. 4 Legislative
and judicial branches alike have responded to the critics. At the
legislative level, governments are curbing punitive damages through
measures related to the broader movement of tort reform. 5 Laws have
been enacted raising the burden of proof necessary for the assessment
of punitive damages,86 capping the amounts of permissible punitive
damages, 7 eliminating punitive damages entirely,88 requiring judges
rather than jurors to calculate punitive damages, 9 and redirecting the
payment of some punitive damages from private plaintiffs to public
purposes."°
Likewise, the judiciary in recent years has exerted a conservative
influence on the calculation of punitive damages. Both trial judges and
appellate courts reduce excessive punitive damage awards granted by

82. Id.
83. Indeed, lodging punitive mechanisms in the civil law simply recognizes the
impracticability of precise delineations in any effective justice system. Punitive damages are
envisioned most accurately as inhabiting an unavoidable "gray area between purely criminal
cases and exclusively compensatory civil claims." James R. McKown, Punitive Damages: State
Trends and Developments, 14 REV.LMG. 419, 423 (1995).
84. Michael Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in Products Liability: Testing Tort
Anecdotes with EmpiricalData, 78 IOWA L. REv.1, 6 (1992).
85. Although punitive damage doctrine originally arose out of the common law, many
passed legislation in the 1980s to clarify and sometimes to reform the remedy.
legislatures
state
See, e.g., TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. §§ 41.001-.009 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
86. See Janie L. Shores, A Suggestion for Limited Tort Reform: Allocation of Punitive
Damage Awards to Eliminate Windfalls, 44 ALA. L. REv. 61, 88 (1992) (noting states that
require "clear and convincing evidence" and even "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" as
standards for awarding punitive damages).
87. See Janet V. Hallahan, Social Interests Versus Plaintiffs' Rights: The Constitutional
Battle over Statutory Limitationson Punitive Damages,26 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 405,414-19 (1995)
(discussing statutes imposing various forms of punitive damage caps).
88. See Shores, supra note 86, at 87-88 (citing statutes in Louisiana, Nebraska, and New
Hampshire that have been interpreted judicially as restricting awards to compensatory damages).
89. Alan Howard Scheiner, Note, JudicialAssessment of Punitive Damages, the Seventh
Amendment, and the Politics of Jury Power, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 142, 142 n.3 (1991).
90. See Hallahan, supra note 87, at 417 (noting nine states directed portions of punitive
damage awards into state funds as of 1995).
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juries.9 In perhaps the most highly publicized instance, a woman in
New Mexico sued McDonald's after being scalded by a cup of hot
coffee and won $2.7 million in punitive damages.' The jury award
against McDonald's, which evoked "howls of outrage and ridicule
nationally," as well as business and insurance group demands
for tort
4
reform,9" was reduced by the trial court judge to $480,000.1
Many efforts toward the judicial curtailment of punitive damages
have been grounded in constitutional protections. In recent years,
appellants have raised the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause
and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause to challenge the
constitutionality of awards, with varying degrees of success. Challenges
to punitive damage awards under the Eighth Amendment's Excessive
Fines Clause fail under a Supreme Court decision holding that "fines"
refer only to payments to the sovereign, and not to civil damages paid
to a private party.95 Because it could find no evidence of the intended
meaning of the word "fines" in the Constitution, the Court interpreted
the term as generally understood when the Eighth Amendment was
adopted. 96 A fine at the time meant "a payment to a sovereign as
punishment for some offense,"97 therefore the Excessive Fines Clause
was construed not to apply to punitive damage awards in private
litigation.98
The more promising constitutional basis for tort reform is due
process, first identified by Justice O'Connor in 1988 as a potentially
successful weapon for foes of excessive punitive damages.99 Opening
91. Of course, overly intrusive judicial review of awards raises constitutional issues
concerning the role of juries. For discussion of the Seventh Amendment implications of judicial
review of jury awards, see generally Roger W. Kirst, Judicial Control of Punitive Damage
Verdicts: A Seventh Amendment Perspective, 48 SMU L. REv. 63 (1994).
92. Liebeck v. McDonald's Restaurants, No. CV-93-02419, 1994 WL 360309 (N.M. Dist.
Aug. 18, 1994).
93. Kim Wessel, Woman Sues Arby's Over Burnsfrom Coffee, COURIER-J., Dec. 27, 1996,
at lB.
94. Liebeck v. McDonald's Restaurants, No. CV-93-02419, 1994 WL 782090 (N.M. Dist.

Ct. Sept. 1994).
95. Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 265 (1989). For analysis
of the decision, see Donald S. Yarab, Comment, Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal,
Inc.: The Excessive Fines Clauseand Punitive Damages, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 569 (1989-

90). For discussion of theories under which Eighth Amendment scrutiny of punitive damages
in civil cases may be developed, see generally Stephen R. McAllister, A PragmaticApproach
to the Eighth Amendment and Punitive Damages, 43 KAN. L. REV. 761 (1995).
96. Browning-Ferris,492 U.S. at 266.
97. Id. at 265.
98. Id. at 263-64.

99. See Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 88 (1988) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part).
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the door for effective constitutional scrutiny of awards, Justice
O'Connor noted in a partially concurring opinion that the exercise by
juries of "wholly standardless discretion" in establishing punishments
appears to violate the strictures of due process."
The due process challenges that followed Justice O'Connor's
observation apply a stream of analysis that began with the 1991
Supreme Court decision in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Haslip.'0 An agent of Pacific Mutual sold Cleopatra Haslip and her
co-workers health 'insurance policies."t After the agent absconded with
Haslip's money, Pacific Mutual cancelled the policies for nonpayment
of premiums.0 3 When Haslip was hospitalized, Pacific Mutual rejected
her claims." 4 Meanwhile, the unpaid hospital placed Haslip's account
The jury awarded Haslip
in the hands of collection agents."
$1,040,000, over four-fifths of which comprised punitive damages."°
On appeal, the Supreme Court focused on trial court activities as
well as Alabama's procedures for reviewing jury awards of punitive
damages." 7 Examining jury instructions,"' post-verdict and appellate
court review procedures," and the actual amount of punitive damages, 1 the Court upheld the award.'
Although the Court held the punitive damage award in Haslip to
comply with constitutional requirements,"' it noted that punitive
damage awards in other instances could violate due process."' The
Court suggested that some degree of jury discretion in assessing punitive
damage awards is permissible, especially if instructions constrain
discretion to legitimate purposes"" and the trial court maintains postverdict procedures for the review of jury awards." 5 By inference, a
failure to provide acceptable review processes and safeguards to
constrain jury discretion may render some punitive damage awards
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
499 U.S. 1 (1991).
Id. at 4-5.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 21-24.
Id. at 19-20.
Id. at 21-23.
Id. at 23.
Id.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 18-24.
Id. at 19-20.
Id.
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vulnerable to due process attack. Accordingly, the Supreme Court
reversed a punitive damage award in Oregon because the state's
prohibited judicial review of punitive damage
constitution virtually
6
assessments."
The Haslip decision stated that punitive damages need not be
assessed under a standard of proof higher than preponderance of
evidence in order to comply with due process." 7 The Court also noted
that while reasonableness and adequate court guidance should enter
assessments of unconstitutional excessiveness, a "mathematical bright
line" cannot be drawn to distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable awards."' While a ratio of punitive to compensatory damages
exceeding four to one was considered to create a borderline case,
Alabama's procedural safeguards rendered the award constitutionally
permissible." 9
A decision rendered two years after Haslip further indicated the
limited value of examining ratios to determine excessiveness of punitive
damages under due process analysis. In TXO Production Corp. v.
Alliance Resources Corp.," ° the Supreme Court applied the criteria it
had established in Haslip to affirm a punitive damage award of $10
million, 526 times the compensatory damage award of $19,000.1"
Conceding that the award was large in comparison to actual injuries, 2
the Court emphasized the severity of the defendant's wrongdoing rather
than the amount of compensatory damages in evaluating constitutionality." Noting the great "magnitude of... potential harm that the
defendant's conduct would have caused" had its fraudulent scheme been
successful, the Court determined that the award complied with the
requirements of due process.'24
The most significant punitive damages reform in recent years came
from the Supreme Court's 1996 decision in BMW of North America v.
Gore."z The case was brought by the purchaser of a BMW who
alleged that BMW fraudulently concealed the partial refinishing of an
automobile sold as new." At trial, the Alabama jury awarded the

116. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 432 (1994).
117. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 23 n.l1.

118. Id. at 18.
119. Id. at 23.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

509 U.S. 443 (1993).
Id. at 453, 466.
Id. at 460.
Id. at 461.
Id. at 462.
116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996).
Id. at 1593. Upon taking it to a detail shop, the plaintiff discovered that the car he had
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plaintiff $4000 in compensatory damages and $4 million in punitive
damages. 27 The trial judge denied BMW's motion to set aside the
punitive damages award, rejecting arguments that the award was so
grossly excessive as to violate Fourteenth Amendment due process."
Alabama's supreme court reduced the punitive damages to $2 million
under the theory that the jury's calculation wrongfully considered
BMW's sales in other states, rather than its sales in Alabama alone.'29
The United States Supreme Court found the $2 million award
"grossly excessive" and therefore in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment."3 In its assessment, the Court referred to three "guideposts" for assessing punitive damage awards in nondisclosure cases
under due process analysis: "the degree of reprehensibility of the
nondisclosure; the disparity between the harm or potential harm suffered
by [the plaintiff] and his punitive damages award; and the difference
between this remedy and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in
comparable cases......
The impact of BMW is registering throughout the federal court
system, as circuit courts apply the decision to reduce punitive damages35
Fourth,13 Fifth,
The Second,'
awards viewed as excessive.'
36
and Tenth Circuits all recently have applied BMW in the review of
punitive damages awarded by juries. To date, BMW has had less effect
in the state courts, 37 several of which have emphasized BMW's

purchased as new had been partially refinished prior to sale. Id. BMW did not disclose pre-sale
repairs to either the dealer or the plaintiff, under a national policy to disclose only those repairs
that equalled three percent or more of the manufacturer's suggested retail price. Id.
127. Id. at 1593-94. The punitive damages were predicated on jury findings that BMW's
nondisclosure policy for repairs falling below the three percent threshold was "gross, malicious,
intentional and wanton fraud." Gore v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 646 So. 2d 619, 622 (Ala. 1994).
128. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. at 1594.
129. Id. at 1595.
130. Id. at 1598.
131. Id. at 1598-99.
132. Margaret A. Jacobs, Federal Courts Use BMW Case to Cut Awards, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 27, 1996, at B1.
133. Lee v. Edwards, 101 F.3d 805, 813 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding $200,000 award against
police officer for malicious prosecution excessive, and offering plaintiff choice of either reduced
award of $75,000 or new trial).
134. Atlas Food v. Crane Nat'l Vendors, 99 F3d 587, 595 (4th Cir. 1996) (noting appellate
judicial discretion in reviewing jury awards).
135. Patterson v. P.H.P. Healthcare Corp., 90 F.3d 927, 943 (5th Cir. 1996) (remanding
case after finding punitive damage award of $150,000 excessive).
136. Continental Trend Resources, Inc. v. OXY USA Inc., 101 R3d 634, 643 (10th Cir.
1996) (finding Tenth Circuit's own pre-BMW punitive damages award of $30 million excessive
in tortious interference case, and reducing punitive damages to $6 million).
137. Claudia MacLachlan, "BMW" Triggers Cuts in Punies, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 20, 1997, at
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mathematical imprecision-i.e., the court's refusal to establish acceptable compensatory-to-punitive damage ratio requirements-as a basis for
punitive awards greatly in excess of compensatory damagupholding
38
es.1

1II. ASSESSING PuNITIvE DAMAGES POLICIES:
BEYOND THE CONSTTUTION

Researchers who have addressed punitive damages in recent years
have tended to focus on the constitutional issues raised in the previous
Part.' 39 Equally important, though, are issues of public policy. Legislatures and courts must understand the legitimate functions of punitive
damages, as well as how the various approaches to their assessment
support or undermine these functions, if they are to fashion optimal
policies.
In view of the potentially irreconcilable literature attacking"' and
defending 4 ' the social and economic effects of punitive damages in
the late twentieth century, this Article's approach is to avoid labelling
problems with sweeping and necessarily inaccurate generalizations.
Instead, the goal is to fashion sound policies based on sound reasoning.
Accordingly, the Article begins under no assumption that punitive
damages are either a force of social evil or a force of social good.
Instead, recognizing both the functions and dysfunctions of punitive
damages, the remaining pages seek to fashion balanced, reasonable
solutions to complex problems.
This Part examines the functions of punitive damages. These include
retribution for wrongdoing, deterrence of wrongdoing, supplementation
of compensatory damage awards to approximate more closely plaintiffs'
true losses and costs, and augmentation of limited state enforcement
resources through the encouragement of private actions. The functions
discussed below will be applied in Part IV to assess various means of
measuring punitive damages.

Al, A17.
138. See id. (citing Schaefer v. Jones, 552 N.W.2d 801 (S.D. 1996) (upholding punitive
damages equal to 30 times compensatory damages); Walston v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 923
P.2d 456 (Idaho 1996) (upholding punitive damages equal to 26 times compensatory damages)).
139. An exhaustive catalogue of this research would be excessively long. Indeed, the reader
can locate scores of studies dealing predominantly or exclusively with constitutional aspects of
punitive damages simply by scanning the titles of law review articles cited in the footnotes
throughout this Article.
140. See supra pt. II.A.
141. See supra pt. II.B.
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A. Retributionfor Wrongdoing
One basic function of punitive damages is retribution.' 42 The
remedy's nomenclature is telling. We label certain damages punitive
because they are intended to punish-"[t]o cause [an offender] to suffer
for an offence."' 43 This function is predicated upon a sense of balance,
justice and desert, in accordance with H.L.A. Hart's admonition that
"punishment must.., match, or be the equivalent of, the wickedness of
[the wrongdoer's] offense."'" This model suggests an ethical component of a just retribution, under a belief that "the return of suffering for
moral evil voluntarily done, is itself just or morally good."' 45
Nonetheless, at least since Shakespeare's Shylock extolled the
blessings of mercy as it "seasons justice,"'" skeptics have looked upon
vengeance with a doubtful eye. Cynicism regarding revenge spilled into
the literature of punitive damages in the 1960s and beyond, evincing
itself in a belief that "vengeance is a questionable objective for a
civilized legal system,"' 47 and a conclusion by some that "[s]ociety has
long since progressed beyond the primitive concept of an eye for an eye
and a tooth for a tooth.""' Of course, despite such idealism, many still
believe that retribution creates rather than destroys order, balance, and
justice.'49
Nevertheless, even for those who would limit mercy in favor of swift
retribution, the application of punishments in civil courts devoted at
least nominally to compensation requires a leap in logic. Punishment
more closely fits the criminal law system than the civil law system. 5°
If retribution is to play a role in civil justice, punitive damages may be
most defensible when the wrongdoer has engaged in behaviors that
resemble criminal behaviors or at least share some of their key

142. Note, An Economic Analysis of the Plaintiff Windfall from Punitive Damage
Litigation, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1900, 1900 (1992).
143. OxFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1603 (1st Compact Ed. 1971).
144. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 231 (1982).
145. Id.
146. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 4, sc. 1.
147. Note, The Assessment ofPunitive DamagesAgainst an Entrepreneurforthe Malicious
Torts of His Employees, 70 YALE L.J. 1296, 1298 (1961).
148. See James B. Sales & Kenneth B. Cole, Jr., Punitive Damages: A Relic That Has
Outlived Its Origins, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1117, 1164 n.214 (1984).
149. See, e.g., Timothy S. Lykowski, Note, 7ightening the ConstitutionalNoose Around
Punitive Damages Challenges: TXO, What It Means, and Suggestions that Address Remaining
Concerns, 68 S. CAL L. REV. 203, 224-25 (1994) (acknowledging benefits and social utility of
punishment).
150. See Cdsarez, supra note 37, at 671 (noting belief of some judges and commentators
that "punishment and deterrence are more appropriately left to the criminal law system").
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characteristics.'51 The Model State Punitive Damages Act thus permits
the award of punitive damages only when the plaintiff can prove a
defendant's "malice and intent to cause serious harm."' 52 Likewise, the
Second Restatement of Torts notes that punitive damages can be
awarded "for conduct that is outrageous, because of the defendant's evil
motive or ... reckless indifference to the rights of others."'53 While
the standards for awarding punitive damages thus vary by source, a
common retributive characteristic is a limitation of the remedy to
behaviors sufficiently severe to justify application of quasi-criminal
principles in civil forums.'"
Subject to this limitation, the retributive function of punitive damages
must rank high among the various purposes typically posited to justify
the remedy. Such preeminence is based on the elemental nature of
retribution in regard to any system of punishment, be it criminal, civil,
or even social (i.e., extra-legal).' 55 Given the very fundamental position
it occupies in punitive systems, retribution will be considered a weighty
function in part IV, which analyzes and assesses various methods of
calculating punitive damages.

151. One might reason that while punishment is more centrally associated with criminal
justice than with civil justice, many forms of punishment nonetheless pervade numerous social
institutions outside the criminal justice system. While this may rationalize the existence of
retribution in civil litigation, it still seems reasonable that the tenor of that retribution be
modeled after prototypes established in the criminal justice system, since that system is the most
clearly focused, direct source of institutionalized retribution in formalized legal systems.
152. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 3, at 1278-79 n.60 (citing MODEL STATE PUNITIVE
DAMAGES AcT § 6 (Office of the Vice President 1992)). This model legislation was proposed
by Vice President Dan Quayle's office as part of the "Agenda for Civil Justice Reform in
America" that came out of the President's Council on Competitiveness.
153. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRS § 908(2) (1979).
154. Standards for awarding punitive damages nonetheless vary significantly by state,
ranging from "fraud, malice, and oppression to reckless behavior[,] ... a conscious disregard
for the safety of others" and "grossly negligent conduct.... ." Wendy S. Kennedy, The
Constitutionality of Punitive Damage Awards and Recent Proposed Legislation, 17 J. PROD. &
ToxicS LIAB. 245, 249 (1995). In the area of environmental torts, punitive damage liability may
be based on knowledge or awareness of "an extremely high risk of harm." Gerald W. Boston,
Environmental Torts and Punitive Damages (Part One), 14 J. PROD. LIAB. 1, 38 (1992).
155. The ancient exhortation to exact "an eye for an eye" reflects the visceral need to
increase a penalty in proportion to the severity of the act being punished. Exodus 21:24. Whether
characterized in the sanitized vernacular of "retribution," or in the less euphemistic but perhaps
more ingenuous language of vengeance or retaliation, humans appear to have a need to exact
a payment that provides the sense of balance and order of an evened score. See Stephen D.
Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 555, 660 (1985) (observing victims'
and societies' need for retribution).
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B. Deterrence of Wrongdoing
Punitive damages theoretically discourage undesirable, morally
culpable, or anti-social behavior. 56 In this guise, they are more
accurately classified as "exemplary damages," in accordance with the
emphasis among some courts that the award is assessed as "an example
to others in like cases." 1" Although the term "punitive damages"
would imply a primary function of retribution and the term "exemplary
damages" would suggest a primary function of deterrence, the two
functions frequently are classified in tandem under either heading.'
Regardless of the term chosen, retribution and deterrence are the most
salient functions of damages assessed in excess of compensation.' 59
The intended deterrent effect of punitive damages is twofold.
Offenders are less likely to repeat their offenses after being punished,
and others are less likely to engage in similar behavior as they watch
and learn from offenders' experiences." 6 Deterring the wrongdoer
from repeating an infraction is labelled "specific deterrence," whereas
deterring others from engaging in the same or similar activities is called
"general deterrence."6
Although deterrence provides a classic rationale for both criminal and
civil punitive institutions in society, 62 justification of punitive damages solely on the basis of deterrence is potentially dangerous. As David
Partlett has observed, deterrence is entirely unrelated to individual
responsibility. 63 If deterrence alone were used to justify punitive
damages, utilitarian calculation of net social welfare" could be

156. Peter M. Mundheim, Comment, The Desirabilityof Punitive Damages in Securities
Arbitration:Challenges Facingthe Industry Regulatorsin the Wake of Mastrobuono, 144 U. PA.
L. REV. 197, 233 (1995).

157. McKeon v. Citizens' Ry., 42 Mo. 79, 87 (1867).
158. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (defining punitive damages
as "private fines levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its future

occurrence").
159. See Andrew M. Kenefick, Note, The Constitutionalityof Punitive Damages Under the
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1699, 1721-22 (1987)
(noting most courts recognize these two functions of punitive damages).
160. Bradford D. Kaufman & Anne Tennant Cooney, Punitive Damages in Securities
Arbitration:An Undue Process, 958 PLI/CoRP. 599, 610 (1996).
161. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 68, at 1043.
162. See Rebecca Dresser, PersonalIdentity and Punishment, 70 B.U. L. REV. 395, 419
(1990) (denoting deterrence as one of the "classic justifications for punishment").
163. David F. Partlett, Punitive Damages: Legal Hot Zones, 56 LA. L. REV. 781, 797
(1996).
164. Utilitarian processes, typically associated with normative philosophy, are built on the
premise that "society is rightly ordered, and therefore just, when its major institutions are
arranged so as to achieve the greatest net balance of satisfaction summed over all the individuals
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employed to impose punitive damages in a manner bearing little
relationship to any conception of justice or desert.16 This potential for
unfairness would be tempered to the degree that punitive damage
deterrence relies on making examples out of the most egregious and
therefore deserving offenders."6 Still, the prospect of economically
rational but socially unjust use of punitive damages for deterrence
purposes remains a theoretical possibility whenever issues other than
desert enter the calculation. 67 Unless deterrence functions are tempered with conceptions more directly related to individual culpability
and responsibility., such as the function of retribution, the risk of
injustice remains.
How to optimize deterrence of undesirable behavior through
assessment of punitive damages is viewed by many in terms of
economics.'" The rational actor seeks to maximize utility by comparing the expected returns of various levels of care.'69 Within this
calculation of the marginal costs and benefits of care options, the
likelihood and predicted magnitude of a punitive damage award
increases predicted costs, thereby deterring a group of infractions that
otherwise would have been profitable. 7 '
It bears noting that while compensatory damages are not intended to
deter undesirable behavior, they nonetheless can serve that function.''
In some instances, the threat of litigation and its burdens, combined with

JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusTICE 22 (1971).
165. Indeed, the deterrence function of punishment is fundamentally utilitarian in its service
as a means to an end. See Alan H. Goldman, The Paradoxof Punishment, 9 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
42, 42 (1979) ("A utilitarian thesis is that the justification for punitive institutions is
deterrence... .
166. In other words, the most serious infractions are most likely to trigger the most severe
deterrents, so that the extremity of punishments aimed at retribution should tend to move in the
same direction as the extremity of punishments aimed at deterrence.
167. An effective deterrent may not be fair from the standpoint of apposite retribution.
Hyper-severe punishments fall in this category. While consistently enforced capital punishment
may be an effective deterrent to graffiti artists on New York City subways, such a sanction
would be insupportably harsh and therefore retributively unjust.
168. See generally, e.g., Robert D. Cooter, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, 56 S.
CAL L. REV. 79 (1982).
169. This particular observation follows from the more general economic tenet that decision
makers seek choices that maximize net gain. See Paul B. Taylor, EncouragingProduct Safety
Testing by Applying the Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis When Punitive DamagesAre Sought,
16 HARV. J.L:& PUB. POL'Y 769,773 (1993) ("Individuals ... will generally engage in conduct
if the contemplated conduct will result in a net gain to themselves....").
170. Amelia J. Toy, Comment, Statutory Punitive Damage Caps and the ProfitMotive: An
Economic Perspective, 40 EMORY L.J. 303, 305-06 (1991).
171. See Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Augmented Awards: The Efficient Evolution of Punitive
Damages, 51 LA. L. REV. 3, 24 (1990) (discussing role of compensatory damages as deterrent).

belonging to it."
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the prospective responsibility for compensating a victim's losses, may
constitute a disincentive sufficient to thwart bad behavior." In other
cases, however, compensatory damages alone will be insufficient to
prevent socially harmful acts. Damages that simply require a defendant
to undo injuries may be seen as low-risk or no risk propositions.
Consider, for example, cases of fraud or theft. The defendant subject
solely to compensatory damages is encouraged to engage in these
activities under economic analysis. The defendant's only risk is having
to return what he or she took, and this risk is discounted by the
possibilities of (i) not being caught, or (ii) not being sued if caught."3
Likewise, in many tort cases, the anticipated profits to be derived
from injurious behavior may exceed the predicted cost of compensating
victims of that behavior. Consider Ford Motor Company's decision to
market the Pinto without fixing an inexpensively reparable design flaw
that management knew to be extremely dangerous." Such a socially
undesirable decision is less attractive if substantial punitive damages
exist as a real threat to decisionmakers. In the absence of punitive
damages, companies employing pure cost-benefit analysis may decide
to engage in dangerous activities when projected profits exceed
projected payments of compensatory damages. States may find the peril
of punitive damages necessary to avert behavior that most would
consider dysfunctional or even horrifying.
Accordingly, despite the risks of injustice that exist when deterrence
is the sole motive for assessing punitive damages, deterrence remains an
important function of the remedy. Along with retribution, it is one of the
two classic goals of any punitive system, and it encourages actors in
social situations to exercise caution and to avoid social harms. Provided
that retribution is considered along with deterrence to ensure that
punitive damages are fair and justifiable, the latter function ranks high
as a defense of the remedy. Deterrence therefore will be treated in Part
IV as commensurate with retribution in assessing methods of calculating
punitive damages.

172. Galligan categorizes these potential costs as "accident costs." See id.
173. Mundheim, supra note 156, at 219.
174. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981). According
to testimony, Ford management decided "to go forward with the production of the Pinto,
knowing that the gas tank was vulnerable to puncture and rupture at low rear impact speeds
creating a significant risk of death or injury from fire and knowing that 'fixes' were feasible at
nominal cost." Id. at 361.
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C. Supplementing Compensatory Damage Awards to Approximate
More Closely Plaintiffs' True Losses and Costs
Some courts17 and commentators 76 suggest that another function
of punitive damages is to permit plaintiffs to recoup their real losses
accurately and fully.'" I shall refer to this as the "compensationaugmentation rationale." The logic here is that gaps exist in the
assessment of compensatory damages, through which plaintiffs with
good cause must suffer net losses after litigating their cases. 78 Punitive damages can narrow or close the difference between actual costs
and costs covered by compensatory damages.
Historically, the compensation function of punitive damages was
related to the failure of compensatory damages under early common law
to cover intangible injuries such as pain, suffering, and emotional
distress.'79 In 1872, the New Hampshire Supreme Court validated the
award of "smart money," meant to cover "any blemish which remains
after the first smart or pain is over."'8 This variety of damages
reflected the court's recognition of an injured party's "right to be free
from such blemishes or from the uneasiness which any deformity may
occasion him.''. Courts evoke punitive damages to circumvent
compensation limitations for other elusive harms, such as the loss of

175. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources, 509 U.S. 443, 463-64 (1993) (observing
trial court instruction that punitive damages serve not only to punish and deter, but also "to
provide additional compensation for the conduct to which the injured parties have been
subjected"); id. at 490 (criticizing trial court's instruction, noting that "[p]laintiffs are
compensated for injuries they have suffered," and that "one cannot speak of additional
compensation unless it is linked to some additional harm").
176. See, e.g., John A. Sebert, Jr., Punitive and Nonpecuniary Damages in Actions Based
on Contract: Toward Achieving the Objective of Full Compensation,33 UCLA L. REV. 1565,
1570-71 (1986) (noting compensatory function of punitive damages in tort law, and recommending same in contract law).
177. See Joan T. Schmit et al., Punitive Damages: Punishmentor FurtherCompensation?,
55 J. RISK & INS. 453, 456 (1988) (noting courts use punitive damages to compensate plaintiffs
for otherwise unrecoverable expenses).
178. Burrows, supra note 65, at 448 ('To ignore the compensatory aspects of punitive
damages is to assume that the injured party is being fully compensated in the current
compensatory damages system.").
179. Gregory A. Williams, Note, Tuttle v. Raymond: An Excessive Restriction upon
Punitive Damages Awards in Motor Vehicle Tort Cases Involving Reckless Conduct, 48 OHIO
ST. L.. 551, 554 (1987). The debate over the compensability of such injuries remains alive
today. See Michael K. Carrier, FederalPreemptionof Common Law Tort Awards by the Federal
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 51 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 509, 610 (1996) (suggesting debate over
compensability of pain, suffering, and emotional distress continues today).
180. Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 354 (1872).
181. Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1997

25

Florida Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 2
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Val. 49

honor.182 So-called "aggravated damages" also may compensate for
"loss of enjoyment of life" or a loss of dignity, as when the plaintiff
suffers a racial epithet or inappropriate sexual interest from a doctor in
a doctor/patient relationship."' Of course, as the law becomes increasingly receptive to awarding compensatory damages for intangible
this justification of punitive damages approaches obsoleslosses,'4
185
cence.
Another aspect of the compensation-augmentation rationale suggests
that litigation is so precarious and strenuous that enhancements such as
treble damages simply permit victims to recover their real losses and
costs.'86 We can understand this justification for punitive damages by
dividing the costs of the plaintiff into two distinct categories-primary
costs of the wrongdoing and secondary costs of the wrongdoing. The
primary costs refer to the immediate burden of the injuries that support
the litigation under a particular cause of action. For example, the
primary costs in a serious accident would include the bodily harm
rendered by the accident, medical bills, loss of wages, and the like.
Secondary costs refer to the injuries the plaintiff suffers from being
subjected to conflict and its resolution. These might include the costs of
nervousness regarding uncertainty of compensation for primary costs;
worry over the stresses of litigation; and time, effort, and concern
expended in resolving the dispute. Secondary costs generally are not
covered in calculations of compensatory damages.1 Punitive damages
arguably fill the breach, as the plaintiff who receives something above
and beyond compensatory damages is more likely to recover for the
ephemeral, generalized distress that accompanies involvement in
litigation. Presuming that punitive damage awards are limited to
egregious violations, a mechanism that helps plaintiffs recover for basic
conflict-related suffering may not be unreasonable."'
182. See, e.g., Tullidge v. Wade, 95 Eng. Rep. 909 (K.B. 1789).
183. Partlett, supra note 163, at 793-94.
184. See, e.g., Berry v. City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1507 (10th Cir. 1990) (stating
compensatory damages can cover such intangible injuries as mental pain and harm to reputation).
185. See Lisa M. Sharkey, Comment, Judge or Jury: Who Should Assess Punitive
Damages?,64 U. CIN. L. REV. 1089, 1103 (1996).
186. Michael Goldsmith & Mark Jay Linderman, Civil RICO Reform: The Gatekeeper
Concept, 43 VAND. L. REV. 735, 744 (1990).
187. See Park-Ohio Indus. v. Tucker Induction Sys., No. 82-2828, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15642, at *12-13 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 21, 1987) (discussing ordinary absence of cause of action for
litigation-related stress).
188. Of course, the contrary argument is that the law does not and can not compensate
individuals for the amorphous pressures that living closely in a complex society will inevitably

create. Indeed, this may be the reason why compensatory damages ordinarily do not cover the
kinds of secondary costs discussed in this Part.
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Finally, the compensatory model suggests that punitive damages can
operate to reimburse plaintiffs for attorneys' fees and other litigationrelated expenses that otherwise are non-compensable.8 9 An analogy
from contract law may be helpful in explaining the logic here. Economists have long recognized that contracts bear not only the cost of
performing substantive promises, but also the cost of negotiating,
drafting, and enforcing agreements."9° The latter class of costs, labeled
transaction costs, concern implementation procedures that must be
calculated if a party is to know the true costs and benefits of any
interaction or relationship with others. 9 ' This concept can be applied
by analogy to litigation, where compensation for the wrongs inflicted
under a cause of action are only part of the total cost borne by a
plaintiff. Expenses associated with use of the legal system and its
procedures to obtain redress can add substantial transaction-related costs
to the plaintiff's search for justice,"9 particularly in a legal system in
which litigation and representation can be very expensive."
Because the charging of legal expenses to the losing party is
discretionary 94 and generally discouraged 95 in the United States,
compensatory damages purporting to "make the plaintiff whole"'"
may fall short of true compensation. In the especially outrageous cases
in which they are assessed, punitive damages arguably enhance justice

189. Williams, supra note 179, at 554.
190. See, e.g., George M. Cohen, The FaultLines in ContractDamages, 80 VA. L. REV.
1225, 1242-43 (1994).
191. Id.; see Manuel A. Utset, Essay, Back to School with Coase: The Production of
Information and Modes of Knowledge Within andAcross Academic Disciplines, 75 B.U. L. REV.
1063, 1065 (1995) (addressing need to incorporate both costs of production and costs of transference in valuation of transactional commodities).
192. See David A. Westbrook, Liberal Environmental Jurisprudence,27 U.C. DAvis L.
REv. 619, 651 (1994) (suggesting rational victims decline to litigate when transaction costs of
legal process exceed compensable harm).
193. For discussion of the high impact of attorneys' fees on litigation costs, see Clinton W.
Francis, Practice,Strategy, andInstitution:Debt Collectionin the English Common-Law Courts,
1740-1840, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 807, 865 (1986).
194. Discretion to charge attorneys' fees to a losing party is generally limited in the United
States to instances of bad faith, such as the pursuit of groundless litigation. See Steven C. Salop
& Lawrence J.White, Economic Analysis of Private Antitrust Litigation, 74 GEo. L.J. 1001,
1029 (1986) ("(C]ourts have discretion to make plaintiffs who file frivolous claims liable for the
defendant's expenses.").
195. See John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured
Person'sAccess to Justice,42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1575-78 (1993) (discussing American rule
constraining attorney fee shifting).
196. Transportation Ins. Co. v Model, 879 S.W.2d 10, 16 (Tex. 1994) ("Compensatory
damages are intended to make the plaintiff 'whole' for any losses resulting from the defendant's
interference with the plaintiff's rights.").
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by charging to a clearly identified wrongdoer the procedural expenses
that have been paid by the victim seeking redress.
Ostensible shortcomings in compensatory damages, however, are a
poor justification for punitive damages. The fundamental premise behind
this justification-i.e., the idea that punitive damage awards should
serve to bolster otherwise insufficient compensatory damage awards to
serve more accurately a just compensation function-is seriously flawed.
Some arguments against conceptualizing punitive damages in terms of
supplementing or correcting compensatory damages are based on the
idea of outmodedness. Under this reasoning, because many former
limitations on compensable injuries have been lifted, punitive damages
are no longer needed to augment compensatory damages. 1" While this
observation is certainly true, one can argue persuasively that compensation-augmentation was never a legitimate justification for the institution
of punitive damages, even when more serious impediments to complete
compensatory awards were firmly entrenched in our legal system.
This argument is based on a fundamental disjunction between the
stated punitive function and the purported compensation function. Use
of punitive damages to round out actual compensation is irrational and
imprecise, as well as duplicitous and disingenuous. The essential misfit
between a punitive remedy and compensatory functions leads to results
that are likely to be inconsistent and indefensible.
The fundamental difficulty in lodging a compensatory function within
the rhetoric of a punitive mechanism is the basic disjunction between
compensation and punishment. Punitive damages awarded to supplement
otherwise inadequate compensatory damages will achieve this end only
sporadically. Presume for the moment that compensatory damages do
indeed fall intolerably short of compensating plaintiffs for their true
losses. Making up the shortfall through punitive damages will adjust
disparities between real and compensatory damages in only a limited set
of cases-i.e., those cases in which the jury finds the defendant's
actions to be sufficiently reprehensible to justify awarding punitive
damages.19 Under this model, availability of a special bonus adjusting
compensatory damages upward to approximate true plaintiff costs
depends on the severity of the defendant's behavior. The result is that
197. Sales & Cole, supra note 148, at 1130 (noting recent expanded availability of
compensatory damages undermines rationale behind supplementary role of punitive damages).
198. This presumes that jury instructions for the award of punitive damages will require
some degree of special defendant culpability to justify punishment. Jury instructions could, of
course, include permission to assess punitive damages in order to cover incidental or intangible
costs to the plaintiff. Apart from the misnomer of designating this function as punitive, such a
system would avoid the problem of selective supplementation only if judges indeed were to
include such a clause in their instructions to juries.
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only an arbitrarily select portion of plaintiffs receive damages enhanced
to cover true costs. This makes no sense--either all plaintiffs should
receive an enhancement to approximate what are arguably the actual
costs, or no plaintiffs should. It is difficult to fathom convincing reasons
for confusing the functions of compensation and punishment, such that
differences in comprehensiveness of plaintiff recovery are made to be
a function of unrelated variables concerning defendant culpability.
Moreover, the kind of award that fairly covers true cost is a policy
issue for legislatures to decide. When courts employ punitive damages
to effect what they may consider to be fairer compensation on a caseby-case basis, they only increase inconsistency, subvert legislative
intentions, and remove some of the impetus for legislatures to revisit the
question of what kinds of costs should be covered by compensatory
damages.'"
Consider, for example, the U.S. convention under which parties
ordinarily pay their own litigation costs and associated expenses.2
This approach can be contrasted with a "loser pays" convention, under
which the loser must cover the winner's litigation expenses."ol The
U.S. presumption against attorney fee shifting differs from the position
of most industrial democracies, and has been subject to much criticism.2" Scholars have suggested that fee shifting enhances fairness and

199. Use of punitive damages to supplement compensation is disingenuous. The common
law, followed by legislatures, has determined the limitations and qualifications of compensatory

damages. For better or worse, states may expressly restrict the kinds of factors that can go into
the calculation of compensatory damages. Some of these restrictions may be wise; others may
be foolhardy. Even in the latter instance, the appropriate way to cure inadequacies in the

calculation of compensatory damages is to recognize them, identify them for what they are,
discuss them, and then honestly and directly make any recomendations considered advisable.

Courts evoking punitive damages as an end-run around even admittedly dysfunctional
compensatory damages restrictions raise numerous concerns. Foremost, by circumventing
statutory edict, the process flouts the legitimate authority of legislatures. See Clay R. Stevens,
Comment, Split-Recovery: A ConstitutionalAnswer to the Punitive Damage Dilemma, 21 PEPP.
L. REV. 857, 865 (1994) ("[P]unitive damages circumvent the current system of compensatory
damages by allowing victims who are being compensated for all damages for which the
legislature chooses to compensate them to recover this additional compensation.").
Regardless of whether a statute's compensatory damage restrictions are optimal, they are the
law. Legislatures should not be thwarted by the judiciary's second guesses. Lawyers, scholars,

and citizens can alert their lawmakers to any inadequacies in policy, which legislators can then
reconsider and alter using the judgment they were elected to exercise.
200. Donald Baker, Litigation: Sucking the Blood of U.S. Businesses, INT'L CORP. L.,
July/Aug. 1993, at 13.
201. Id. For discussion and comparison of the two approaches, see generally Vargo, supra
note 195.
202. Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory ofAttorney Fee Shifting: A CriticalOverview,
1982 DuKF L.J. 651, 651.
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equity by permitting the winning party to recoup all the costs necessary
to be made truly whole, including the transaction costs of litigation.
Some also note that fee shifting discourages nuisance litigation by
increasing the risks and costs of bringing spurious suits." Yet despite
these arguments, the U.S. approach avoids some potential disadvantages
of fee shifting. For example, fee shifting can discourage good-faith
litigation when outcomes are uncertain.2 5
Ultimately, the decision to permit winners to recoup their litigation
expenses from losers is a political decision that properly falls within the
dominion of legislatures. Attempts to achieve more complete compensation for plaintiffs through the awarding of punitive damages therefore
circumvent proper political channels. Legislatures should be left free to
weigh the costs and benefits of the different approaches to fee shifting,
and to develop the policies that they consider to be in the best interests
of the constituencies that elected them.
In recognition of all these problems, the assessment of punitive
damages for compensatory purposes has been roundly and justifiably
criticized by numerous judges and legal scholars.' Accordingly,
compensatory functions will be weighed very low in Part IV, as we
analyze the utility of various calculation methods.
D. Augmentation of Limited Government Enforcement Resources
Through the Encouragement of PrivateActions
To some authorities, punitive damages exist primarily to benefit
society rather than plaintiffs.' One purported social benefit of punitive damages is the creation of a corps of private litigants who
203. See David A. Barrett, DeclaratoryJudgmentsfor Libel: A Better Alternative, 74 CAL.
L. REV. 847, 851 (1986) ("Fee-shifting provides the dual benefits of making deserving plaintiffs
whole and discouraging frivolous suits.").
204. See id.; see also Lorraine Wright Feuerstein, Comment, Two-Way Fee Shifting on
Summary Judgment or Dismissal:An Equitable Deterrentto UnmeritoriousLawsuits, 23 PEPP.
L. REV. 125 (1996).
205. See Gregory A. Hicks, Statutory Damage Caps Are an Incomplete Reform: A Proposal
for Attorney Fee Shifting in Tort Actions, 49 LA. L. REV. 763, 790 (1989) (arguing acceptable
fee-shifting systems must be designed to avoid this effect).
206. See James A. Breslo, Comment, Taking the Punitive Damage Windfall Away from the
Plaintiff. An Analysis, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 1130, 1135 (1992) (noting virtually unanimous
sentiment among legal scholars that punitive damages should not serve the function of
compensation).
207. Thiry v. Armstrong World Indus., 661 P.2d 515, 518 (Okla. 1983) (observing
compensatory damages exist for benefit of plaintiffs, whereas punitive damages exist for benefit
of society). For discussion of the societal benefit perspective generally, see Janet Malloy Link,
When a Sting Is Overkill: An Argument for the Dischargeof Punitive Damages in Bankruptcy,
94 COLUM. L. REV. 2724, 2740 (1994).
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effectively serve as auxiliary law enforcement officials. 2' Under this
line of reasoning, parties seeking punitive damages supplement public
law enforcement efforts which, constrained by limitations on state
resources, are frequently inadequate. The system allows civil juries to
assess "private fines."'
The prospect of receiving the revenues
thereby generated encourages victims to serve as private, supplemental
attorneys general, so that the institution of punitive damages helps
uncover and penalize wrongs that might otherwise escape detection.210
The utility of using plaintiffs as supplemental police and prosecutors
has been grounded in presumed power disparities. Individual victims of
wrongdoing suffer from a power asymmetry relative to large corporations, and governments constrained by tax-based declining budgets
cannot realistically pursue actions against all those individuals and
entities technically subject to their control."' If defendants indeed bear
these claimed advantages over their victims and the officials charged
with protecting the public, a gap may exist in the effective maintenance
of the social order. The reasoning concludes that punitive damage
awards encourage private litigation, which is tantamount to private
enforcement of the law.
Encouraging private actions to augment limited state enforcement
resources is controversial. The power disparity argument makes a
number of assumptions that can be faulty. For example, not all
defendants are corporations having asymmetrically great power in need
of curbing; not all plaintiffs are relatively powerless individuals in need
of protection. Likewise, one can question the assumption that the size
and power of government law enforcement agencies can do nothing to
balance the presumed power asymmetry between victim and wrongdoer.
Perhaps more significantly, the use of punitive damages to encourage
private attorneys general to bring socially beneficial lawsuits presumes
that punitive damage awards indeed are directed to violations that could
have been prosecuted by public officials but for constraints upon their
time and resources. When punitive damage awards seek to punish
wrongs for which civil liability obtains but for which no criminal or

208. This social benefit falls under what is commonly called the "private attorney general
rationale," under which the impetus of punitive damages encourages plaintiffs to sue wrongdoers

who might otherwise avoid prosecution. E. Jeffrey Grube, Note, Punitive Damages:A Misplaced
Remedy, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 839, 851 (1993).
209. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974).
210. Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, His and Her Tort Reform: Gender Injustice in
Disguise, 70 WASH. L. REv. 1, 11 n.40 (1995).
211. See Sandra L. Nunn, Casenote, The Due ProcessRamifications of Punitive Damages,
Continued: TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993), 63 U.

CN. L. REv. 1029, 1044 n.61 (1995).
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quasi-criminal liability has been designated, the awards arguably extend
rather than augment the efforts of attorneys general. When legislators
have not designated wrongs as actionable and therefore subject to the
enforcement power of public officials, the supposed supplementation of
government forces may function more as a usurpation by the court
system of what is commonly viewed as legislative prerogative.212
Such criticism notwithstanding, the supplementary enforcement
function of punitive damages is an important one. This will be true,
however, only if retribution is a fundamental motive behind punitive
damages, and the retributive function seeks and indeed provides the
imposition of a just remedy. Under these conditions, punitive damages
expand the reach of justice beyond the scope that law enforcement
entities can provide. The benefits of this dynamic obtain regardless of
the existence or absence of size and power disparities between plaintiffs
and defendants. In other words, the private enforcement argument does
not depend upon the "plaintiff as victim, defendant as colossus"
assumptions that can be challenged by punitive damage critics.
Likewise, criticism that punitive damages usurp legislative prerogatives
are unconvincing because legislatures are not the sole source of justice
in common law systems.213 Accordingly, for the purposes of the
analysis in the next Part, the function of supplementing law enforcement
efforts will be viewed as an important ancillary to the two classical
functions of retribution and deterrence. Because this function is
secondary, it should be moderately influential in shaping punitive
damages policy.
IV. METHODS OF CALCULATING PUNITIVE DAMAGES

This Part discusses and assesses the various methods used and
criteria applied to calculate punitive damages.214 Compared with the
calculation of compensatory damages, the calculation of punitive
damages is imprecise and potentially arbitrary.21 5 Compensatory
damages are explicitly related to a plaintiff's loss.216 Despite differences in how loss is measured, the goal of compensation-i.e., to make the
212. See Meredith & Casey, supra note 30, at 960-61 (describing certain court and jury
awards of punitive damages as usurpation of legislature's exclusive power to determine crimes
and fashion punishments).
213. See Brown v. City of Omaha, 160 N.W.2d 805, 808 (Neb. 1968) (containing detailed
discussion of latitude of courts under common law to supplement legislative efforts at justice).
214. See Transportation Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 27-28 (Tex. 1994) (discussing
factors that juries are permitted to consider in calculating punitive damages).
215. Vagueness of standards used to determine punitive damages has been evoked to
criticize them. See, e.g., Owen, supra note 32, at 384.
216. See Feinberg, supra note 38, at 355.
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aggrieved party whole again-is relatively clear and straightforward.1 7
In contrast, the concept of damages calculated to punish a defendant is
slippery. This relative imprecision of punitive damages results from a
number of factors.
First, punitive damages are discretionary by definition. Whereas
juries must award compensatory damages fashioned to recompense the
plaintiff's loss, 218 they are free to exercise a degree of judgment and
discretion1 in deciding whether to grant punitive damages, and if so,
how much to award.' Second, courts have not embraced a single
measuring criterion for punitive damages commensurate with the lossamelioration standard that exists for compensatory damages. 2 Courts
explicitly or implicitly seek different ends when they apply various tests
or standards to assess punitive damages. Then, within each possible test

217. Compensation for losses varies for a number of reasons. First, not all losses are
equally tangible. For example, the loss of property commonly sold on the market may be
relatively easy to measure, whereas the loss of enjoyment of various activities resulting from an
accident is subjective. Second, varying ways of measuring losses will result in different
assessments. Replacement value is different from cost minus depreciation, for example. Third,
fairness of compensation is restrained by the inability of some monetary rewards to achieve the
desired end of making the plaintiff whole. Thus, a compensatory award cannot restore a life, so
that the money received by a family in a wrongful death accident as compensatory damages can
hardly be said to compensate for the loss.
218. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 52 (1983) ("Compensatory damages... are mandatory;
once liability is found, the jury is required to award compensatory damages in an amount
appropriate to compensate the plaintiff for his loss.").
219. This freedom is not unbounded, of course, as has become apparent in some of the
recent decisions discussed in Part H.C. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has stated that
"unlimited jury discretion-or unlimited judicial discretion for that matter-in the fixing of
punitive damages may invite extreme results that jar one's constitutional sensibilities." Pacific
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991). Thus while juries have traditionally been
given substantial discretion in determining punitive damage liability, the Constitution now guards
against excessive arbitrariness by encouraging such mechanisms as guidelines and instructions.
Stephanie L. Nagel, Recent Development, BMW v. Gore: The United States Supreme Court
Overturns an Award of Punitive Damages as Violative of the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1025, 1029 (1997).
220. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. at 52.
221. The classic function of compensatory damages is to restore the plaintiff to the position
she occupied before a wrongdoing, or would have occupied had the wrongdoer acted properly.
This function is couched in terms so routinely used and so consistent as to be second nature to
most students of law. See, e.g., Bellsouth Telecomm., Inc. v. Johnson Bros. Corp., 1997 U.S.
App. LEXIS 12680, *20 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting jury charge at trial: "The purpose of
compensatory damages is to make the plaintiff whole; that is, to compensate the plaintiff for the
damage that the plaintiff has suffered... [,] to place the injured person as nearly as possible
in the condition he would have occupied if the wrong had not occurred.").
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or standard, the same disparities and inaccuracies that can afflict
calculation of compensatory damages, particularly differences in
approaches to measurement, also can afflict calculation of punitive
damages.2" Third, while courts typically issue instructions concerning
the factors juries may consider in determining punitive damages, 23
decision processes are likely to vary enormously.224 Courts ordinarily
cannot train juries to apply standard decision models that would weigh
factors consistently across cases. Such an effort would be confounded
by constraints on the time and financial resources needed to instruct lay
jurors to do complex, rigorously consistent analysis.'
In other words, whereas conflict and imprecision in determining
compensatory damages exist primarily in the single dimension of
measurement, conflict and imprecision in determining punitive damages
exist at three levels-measurement, choice of a goal and the standards
to achieve the goal, and consistent application of complex
decisionmaking models. Moreover, all three of these sources of
imprecision are potentially exacerbated by institutional factors that can
obscure the relationship between the punitive damages assessed by juries
and their actual punitive effect. These include mechanisms such as

222. For example, it was noted earlier that a loss can be measured by replacement cost or
original purchase cost minus depreciation, resulting in very different results. See supra note 217.
The same kinds of measurement problems exist in assessing punishments, with disparities
possible even among two different approaches that seek to achieve identical ends. Thus
punishment intended to be large enough to be felt by a particular defendant could be fashioned
according to net worth or according to annual income, two different measures that would likely
result in different punitive damage calculations.
223. See, e.g., Pacific Mut. Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 6 n.1 (1991) (noting trial court's
instructions to jury to take into account in fixing any punitive damages "the character and the
degree of the wrong as shown by the evidence and necessity of preventing similar wrong").
224. As one commentator observes, calculation of punitive awards is confounded when
instructions lack guidance regarding "how to pull the numbers together." Lykowski, supra note
149, at 207.
225. Because of these constraints on fair, equitable, consistent jury awards of punitive
damages, some states have shifted the authority to award punitive damages from juries to judges.
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-240b (West 1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3701 (1994).
These statutes raise the issue of whether judicial punitive damage assessment violates
constitutional rights to trial by jury. See Zoppo v. Homestead Ins. Co., 644 N.E.2d 397 (Ohio
1994); Smith v. Printup, 866 P.2d 985 (Kan. 1993). For arguments favoring constitutionality of
judicial punitive damage assessment, see Sharkey, supra note 185.
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liability insurance coverage" and bankruptcy discharge, 7 each of
which can nullify or reduce the intended punitive impact.
The translation of this imprecision into potential arbitrariness
becomes evident when we examine the various models that are used to
calculate punitive damages. The following Parts examine and evaluate
the major approaches, which include calculation of punitive damages (1)
to reflect the seriousness of the infraction, (2) to supplement shortcomings of compensatory damages, (3) to reflect the economic condition of
the defendant, (4) as a multiple of compensatory damages, and (5)
subject to the imposition of statutory caps. As we address each of these
approaches individually, it is important to remember that courts
frequently apply them in some combination.
A. Punitive Damages Calculated to Reflect the
Seriousness of the Infraction
Perhaps the most obvious factor in assessing punitive damages is the
nature and severity of the violation underlying a jury's decision to
fashion a punishment. Seriousness of infraction is a valuable, highly
justifiable criterion for measuring punitive damages because it aids the
rational implementation of the most defensible, central functions of
punitive damages, while bearing no relationship to the weakest and least
supportable functions. Specifically, egregiousness of behavior is highly
relevant to both of the classic punitive functions-retribution ' and
deterrence 9 as well as to the ancillary and supporting function of
enabling private attorneys general. 2" Likewise, egregiousness is
unrelated to the insupportable function of providing supplementary
"'
compensation.23
226. Prosser and Keeton suggest that sound public policy precludes the coverage of punitive
damages under liability insurance policies. W. PAGE KEETON Er AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON
hIE LAW OF ToRTs § 2, at 13 (5th ed. 1984). Not all courts, however, have banned insurance
coverage of punitive damages. Joe McKay, Comment, Texas Public Policy on Insuring Punitive
Damages: Time for a Fresh Look, 2 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 205 (1995). For discussion of
liability insurance as it relates to punitive damages generally, see Alan I. Widiss, Liability
Insurance Coveragefor Punitive Damages? DiscerningAnswers to the Conundrum Createdby
Disputes Involving ConflictingPublic Policies, PragmaticConsiderationsand PoliticalActions,
39 VILL. L. REv. 455 (1994).
227. For discussion of the current debate over dischargeability of punitive damage awards
under bankruptcy adjudications generally, see Constance C. Vaughan, The Dischargeability
Debate: Are Punitive Damages Dischargeable Under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A)?, 10 BANKR.
DEVs. J. 423 (1994); Link, supra note 207.
228. For discussion and ranking of this function of punitive damages, see supra pt. IH.A.
229. For discussion and ranking of this function of punitive damages, see supra pt. III.B.
230. For discussion and ranking of this function of punitive damages, see supra pt. III.D.
231. For discussion and ranking of this function of punitive damages, see supra pt. III.C.
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Retributive justice demands that a wrongdoer's payment be commensurate with the violation or wrong committed.232 In the vernacular of
retribution, the magnitude of a punishment is fair when it is scaled to
match the magnitude of the culpability of an offense; conversely, a
punishment may be unjustly inadequate or excessive if it is scaled to
match other factors. Implicit in this observation is the fundamental
notion that a just punishment is associated most closely with degree of
malicious intent or volition, and not with more random aspects of bad
behavior, such as the nature of the injuries that happen to result from
the wrong.233 Accordingly, as the due process standards established in
BMW suggest,2' reprehensibility of conduct is an important and valid
consideration in assessing fair punitive damages.
This approach is probably the most intuitively appealing means of
establishing punitive damages because it most clearly reflects a core
principle of punishment derived from our criminal justice system.235
Since punitive damages serve quasi-criminal functions,236 it seems
fitting that their assessment be patterned after a criminal system that
fashions payments largely in terms of blameworthiness. Andrew
Kenefick notes this consistency, observing that criminal and civil
punishments alike "are assessed with respect to the defendant's
culpability and the egregiousness of his conduct." '

232. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 3, at 1320.
233. See Galanter & Luban, supra note 81, at 1432 ("A retributivist scales punishment to
the heinousness of the offense, and that is not measured by the magnitude of harm."). Of course,
the degree of malicious intent and the extent of injuries can be correlated. Their relationship is
likely to be somewhat connected, somewhat random. Consider the tortfeasor (and criminal) who
plunges a dagger into a plaintiff's heart. The degree of injury is hardly random here, and the
likelihood is that the plaintiff will suffer serious or deadly harm. Nonetheless, there are elements
of fortune that enter into the nature of the injuries. Sometimes the battery will lead to immediate
death, because the impact on the heart was extremely pernicious. At other times, luck will
intervene and the point of impact will result in injuries short of death, from which a plaintiff
may recover fully. The difference between the lethal impact and the almost lethal impact from
which full recovery occurs may be the difference of an inch in the accuracy of the tortfeasor's
aim. Yet in terms of punishment, the tortfeasor's culpability is the same in either instance, and
a just retribution logically should be tied much more closely to the tortfeasor's malice and intent
than to the vicissitudes of actual injuries sustained from one case to the next.
234. See supra text accompanying note 131. As one commentator writing for an insurance
trade publication notes, multi-million dollar awards may be excessive when assessed for
relatively minor offenses such as "bad paint jobs." Editorial Comment, Punitive DamagesBattle
Is Farfrom Over, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, June 3, 1996, at 30. While "bad paint jobs" may be
an oversimplified characterization of the practices that were the subject of litigation in BMW,
the observation that punishments should reasonably match infractions is valid.
235. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 3,at 1320.
236. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
237. Kenefick, supra note 159, at 1703.
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The nexus between culpability measures and just retribution in itself
suggests a reasonable connection between culpability measures and
effective deterrence. A prospective wrongdoer deciding whether to
engage in socially undesirable behavior can apply any of a number of
analytical processes. These include moral analysis, whereby some
decisionmakers will reject the behavior for classically ethical reasons,
such as its net negative utility under teleological analysis23" or its
abrogation of recognized moral duties under deontological analysis.2 9
An amoral or immoral decisionmaker may reject a behavior based on
personal risks and costs. This is where the deterrence function of
punitive damages fits. Of course, cost measures such as the projected
degree of harm resulting from an activity are highly unreliable sources
for a decisionmaker to consult, since variance in injuries is so unpredictable across cases. 2" Culpability of the act itself is a more reliable and
accessible factor for the prospective wrongdoer to consider, because
malice and intent are fully fixed before the act occurs, and can be
measured according to examples provided by punitive damages assessed
in earlier cases on the basis of the egregiousness of like behavior.
Accordingly, degree of wrongful intent is a relatively unambiguous,
accessible, and potentially reliable yardstick, the use of which should
yield effective deterrence of potential wrongdoers, subject, of course, to
constraints upon their ability to extrapolate rationally from analogous
historic instances.
Culpability measures likewise are consistent with punitive damages'
ancillary function of creating in civil litigants a corps of private
attorneys general."' Prospective plaintiffs can identify malice, wrongful intent, recklessness, and other breaches that fall within the other
relatively severe culpability standards that tend to be required for the
award of punitive damages.242 Using this information, their attorneys
should be able to assess the prospects of litigation readily and reasonably accurately, provided historic returns are predicated in part on
culpability measures.243 This dynamic enhances the potential and the

238. For explanation of teleological approaches to ethical decisionmaking, see RAWLS,
supra note 164, at 22-27.
239. For explanation of deontological approaches to ethical decisionmaking, see id. at 30.
240. Uncontrollable and unforeseeable elements such as luck can have a tremendous effect
on injuries sustained. The grossly negligent tortfeasor who sets a dangerous instrumentality in
motion may cause deadly injury or no injury, and the difference can be a function of the

fortuitous direction of the instrument in either of two directions separated by mere inches.
241. See supra pt. III.D.
242. See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
243. This capability of plaintiffs' attorneys is deduced from the relative ease with which
malicious and wrongful intentions can be identified, combined with the attorney's use of stare
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incentives for plaintiffs in civil suits to supplement official law
enforcement efforts. Accordingly, culpability measures, which are
consistent with the two primary punitive functions of retribution and
deterrence, also are likely to enhance the reach of public officials whose
efforts are aimed towards the same ends.
Finally, consulting the wrongful intent of the defendant to calculate
punitive damages is entirely unrelated to the undesirable end of
enhancing compensatory damages. The defendant's culpability bears no
logical connection to the effectiveness of compensatory damages in
making fair and full restitution. Because compensation-augmentation
functions of punitive damages are an undesirable usurpation of
legitimate legislative and common law prerogatives,2 the disjunction
between egregiousness measures and true compensation should weigh
positively in our assessment of the value of the measures.
B. Punitive Damages Calculated to Supplement
Compensatory Damages in Order to Compensate
Plaintiffs Accurately and Fully
We discussed in Part III.C. the theory that punitive damages allow
plaintiffs to recover losses and recoup costs that are not covered by
compensatory damages. This reasoning suggests that punitive damages
supplement a remedial system that fails to compensate plaintiffs fully,
and therefore falls short of the compensatory goal of rendering plaintiffs
whole.245 The areas of omission typically subsumed in this category
are unrecoverable intangible losses, damages associated with the
riskiness and the stress of litigation, and noncompensable attorneys' and
other court-related fees and expenses.2 If a supplemental compensatory function of punitive damages is legitimized and accepted, a logical
implication is that plaintiffs' unrecovered expenses can be a consideration in determining the amount of punitive damages that should be
awarded.
The discussion in Part III.C. demonstrated that the compensatory
rationale for punitive damages is seriously flawed, and therefore should
decisis to locate analogous precedents and the awards granted under similar circumstances.
244. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
245. See Jean C. Love, Presumed General Compensatory Damages in ConstitutionalTort
Litigation: A CorrectiveJustice Perspective, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 67, 68 (1992) ("[I]f the
plaintiff is not successful in recovering a substantial sum of money for [intangible losses] ....
then the compensatory damages award will have neither the desired compensatory nor deterrent
effect."); Aaron D. Twerski, Punitive Damages: Through the Five Prisms, 39 VILL L. REV. 353,
353 (1994) (discussing supplemental compensation achieved by punitive damages for potentially
uncovered items such as suffering and attorneys' fees).
246. See supra text accompanying notes 179-93.
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be ranked low as a function that might justify a particular method of
calculation. Recall that the basic problem with compensation-augmentation models of punitive damages is their disingenuousness and their
tendency to undermine legislative or other legitimate policymaking
prerogative." The dishonesty of couching compensation in a nominally punitive remedy is sufficient reason for rejecting the use of compensation-augmentation measures to assess punitive damages. More
pragmatically, such measures also are unlikely to yield fair awards that
accurately serve the purported compensatory ends.
For example, the duplicity of applying punitive damages to adjust
compensation can confuse jurors or confound their deliberative
processes. Consider that a judge might take either of two tracks in
providing jury instructions. The first is to profess candidly that in
calculating punitive damages, the jury should consider costs to the
plaintiff that cannot be recovered as compensatory damages. Under this
approach, the judge openly acknowledges and validates the compensation-augmentation function. The second track is to instruct jurors to
consider only a number of other issues, such as the severity of the
defendant's violation, the amount of compensatory damages, and the
defendant's financial wherewithal. 2' A judge using this latter approach
may approve of the compensation-augmentation function of punitive
damages as an overall justification of the remedy, but may not approve
of compensation-augmentation as a consideration for juries as they
calculate punitive damage awards.
While either of these instructional options is troublesome, we focus
here on the first option, since it is the one in which compensationaugmentation is authorized as a factor for juries to consider in calculating punitive damages.249 Instructions that legitimize the compensation-

247. See supra text accompanying notes 199-206.
248. Under this latter approach, the judge who accepts a compensatory function of punitive
damages would simply hope that the assessment happens to cover otherwise noncompensable

plaintiff costs.
249. The shortcomings of the second instructional option are not directly relevant to our
assessment of using compensation-augmentation to measure punitive damages, since the second
option declines to include a compensation-augmentation function in jury instructions. It bears
mentioning, however, that the second option is troublesome. Recognizing shortcomings in the

first instructional option, a judge might omit compensatory factors from the jury instructions.
The result, however, would remain unsatisfactory in regard to reaching some kind of
compensatory result. The jury's deliberative processes would be confounded by the existence
of an unstipulated goal that bears no connection to the factors designated in the instructions. If
punitive damages are to help fully compensate the plaintiff, then calculation via consideration
of severity of offense, wealth of defendant, or other punitive factors may or may not serve the
purpose. Under this scenario, the judge is asking for one thing and hoping, incidentally, to
achieve an unrelated goal. The problems that attend either set of instructions, like all problems
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augmentation function are likely to confuse jurors, who are asked on
one hand to assess something that is labelled punitive, but on the other
hand to consider compensation in the process. An intelligent juror would
reasonably ask herself, "What exactly are we supposed to be doing
here?" The murkiness could be exacerbated if manifestly punitive
factors, such as the severity of the defendant's offense, were combined
with compensatory factors in the jury instructions.
Despite its weaknesses, the compensatory model of punitive damages
bears one advantage missing from all the other calculation methods
discussed in this section. It avoids the "windfall critique" of punitive
damages, which suggests that payment of punitive awards to plaintiffs
is unfair and undeserved.' When punitive damages are fashioned to
supplement inadequate or constrained compensatory awards, any
amounts received by plaintiffs cannot be challenged as providing them
with an unjustifiable premium.
For two reasons, avoidance of the windfall critique is insufficient to
salvage punitive damages that are calculated to provide accurate

compensation. First, the minor advantage of averting a windfall cannot
compensate for all the disadvantages of compensatory calculations that
have been identified in this Part and in Part III.C. Second, to the extent
that windfalls may be considered an intolerable by-product of punitive
damages calculated on the basis of other factors, such as defendant
culpability or defendant wealth, awards or portions of awards can be

associated with compensation-seeking punitive damages, result directly from dishonest
designation.
250. Specifically, the critique questions awarding plaintiffs hundreds of thousands or even
millions of dollars above and beyond compensation, simply because the defendant's behavior
happens to have been particularly egregious. Dating back decades, critics have suggested that
awarding punitive damages to plaintiffs is irrational. In the 1920s, one judge observed that "a
frequent objection to the doctrine [permitting punitive damages] is in allowing an individual to
recover and appropriate damages for an offense against the social order and the interest of
society." Eshelman v. Rawalt, 131 N.E. 675, 677 (111. 1921). Consistent with these comments,
critics of punitive damages have argued that receipt by plaintiffs is a windfall. See, e.g., Sales
& Cole, supra note 148, at 1165 (referring to punitive damages as windfall to plaintiff, given
wide extent of and access to compensatory damages). One British commentator characterizes
punitive damages as "a lottery whereby a handful of victims benefit hugely, over and above any
compensation for their injuries," depriving the Exchequer of "what is in reality a fine." Simon
Jenkins, These Damages Must Be Wrong, TIMES, Dec. 14, 1996, at Features, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File.
251. The conditional nature of this clause is to suggest that the windfall critique of punitive
damage awards may be relatively unimportant within the framework of the policy issues
addressed in this article. Punitive damage supporters might wonder who is harmed by plaintiff
windfalls if the damages are calculated fairly in terms of the imposition they place upon
defendants.
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redirected to state funds that are less vulnerable to the windfall
critique.5 2
C. Punitive Damages Calculatedas a Function of the
Economic Condition of the Defendant
In some states, courts are permitted to consider a defendant's net
worth25 in assessing punitive damages.' The logic here is simple:
if a defendant is to be punished and deterred, she must register the
imposition of punitive damages. 5 For this to occur, the damages must
be fashioned with an eye toward the defendant's financial wherewith-

al.256
252. Judges and commentators in the 19th century began suggesting that a more just
distribution of punitive damages might direct at least some of the award to the public rather than
to private litigants. In the words of one Wisconsin judge, "it is... difficult to understand why,
if the tortfeasor is to be punished by exemplary damages, they should go to the compensated
sufferer, and not to the public in whose behalf he is punished." Bass v. Chicago & N.W. Ry.,
42 Wis. 654, 672 (1877).
Accordingly, a number of states have passed extraction statutes, which direct a portion of
punitive damages to the state rather than the plaintiff. Also known as split recovery statutes, they
require the state's share of punitive damages to go into the state treasury or into special pools.
Mathew J. Klaben, Note, Split-Recovery Statutes: The Interplay of the Takings and Excessive
Fines Clauses, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 104, 105 (1994).
The logic behind extraction statutes is simple-when awarded to plaintiffs, punitive damages
yield undeserved profits that can be directed to more deserving recipients. The most obvious and
deserving alternative recipients are tort victims who have been unable to receive compensation
for reasons such as defendant insolvency. See Leo M. Stepanian II, Comment, The Feasibility
of Full State Extraction of Punitive Damages Awards, 32 DUQ. L. REV. 301, 317 (1994)
(discussing tort victim compensation funds derived from punitive damage awards, intended to
compensate plaintiffs "who could not have their compensatory judgments satisfied because of
the defendant's insolvency"). If some or all punitive damages are funneled to such alternative
recipients, the reasonable result is to approach but not surpass full compensation for all tort
victims.
253. Use of defendant's net worth as a factor in the assessment of punitive damages is
complicated when the award would be paid either fully or partially by an insurance company
through some form of liability policy indemnification. While the implications of indemnification
go beyond the purview of this article, courts have addressed the admissibility of alternative
sources of payment in punitive damage cases. See, e.g., Perrin v. Anderson, 784 E2d 1040 (10th
Cir. 1986).
254. See Comment, Discovery of Net Worth in Bifurcated Punitive Damages Cases: A
Suggested Approach After Transportation Insurance Co. v. Moriel, 37 S. TEx. L. REV. 193, 194
n.4 (1996) (citing state and federal cases in which evidence of net worth admitted for purposes
of calculating punitive damages).
255. See Lunsford v. Morris, 746 S.W.2d 471, 472-73 (Tex. 1988) (noting $100 awarded
against single mother with three children can be greater deterrent than $100,000 awarded against
large corporation); Baldus et al., supra note 6, at 1247 ("What may be a substantial punishment
to a defendant of limited means could be negligible to a rich defendant.").
256. See Michael J. Pepek, Note, TXO v. Alliance: Due Process Limits and Introducing
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In evaluating the use of a defendant's wealth to fashion punitive
damages, the criminal law provides an interesting point of comparison.
It is the fining aspect rather than the sentencing aspect of criminal law
that is relevant to punitive damages calculations. Because both fines and
damages are monetary, the punitive and deterrent effect of each logically
should vary with the wealth of the defendant.2" The punitive and
deterrent effects of incarceration logically should be unaffected by, and
independent of, a defendant's net worth."' Accordingly, assets would
be an irrational consideration in sentencing a defendant to a particular
amount of time in prison.
Ordinarily, a defendant's wealth is not a consideration in assessing
penalties under the U.S. criminal justice system. Fines in criminal cases
are determined without regard to a defendant's financial holdings, and
if the issue ever is permitted to be raised, it is only after a fine has been
imposed. 9 Indeed, defendant wealth is the only variable in regard to
which the punitive damages calculation fails to track variables applied
to criminal sentencing. 6 °
Criminal sanctions and punitive damages serve like functions of
retribution and deterrence. Why would two parallel systems seeking the
same ends differ in regard to consideration of defendant wealth? Some
possible inferences regarding the disparity are that (1) the criminal
system's resource blindness serves legitimate ends that are pertinent to
punitive damage calculations, (2) the civil system's consideration of
a Defendant's Wealth When Determining Punitive DamagesAwards, 25 PAC. L.J. 1191, 1227-28
(1994) (discussing need to link punitive damages with defendant wealth if remedy is to serve
punitive and deterrent functions).
257. Obviously, the relationship between the deterrent effect of punitive damages and
consideration of a defendant's net worth is prospective, and operates because a defendant is
aware of the generic use of net worth as a calculation variable. A defendant weighing socially
undesirable behavior will acknowledge the use of net worth in punitive damage assessment, and
therefore will use personal net worth as a factor in estimating possible costs associated with
litigation. Theoretically, if net worth is a predictable assessment factor, it will be incorporated
in such risk assessment activities, thereby affecting decision outcomes and serving the ostensible
deterrence function.
258. This idea builds on a basic presumption that freedom is equally valued across social
strata, subject to random disparities among individuals within a stratum. Some economists might
contend that the value of freedom is dependent on the revenues that freedom can produce, and
hence is related to measures correlated with net wealth. I reject this valuation system under a
presumption that so fundamental an end of freedom is precious to all alike, and that an
individual's relatively low revenue generation would have an insubstantial or nonexistent effect
on her valuation of freedom to pursue whatever ends she considers desirable. To calculate the
value of freedom in terms of the money one would make if one were free is to devalue
alternative uses of time and liberty.
259. Kezemy v. Peters, 79 F.3d 33, 34 (7th Cir. 1996).
260. Baldus et al., supra note 6, at 1154.
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defendants' resources is sensible and superior to the criminal system's
resource blindness, (3) the two approaches are equally functional, so the
disparity is really irrelevant, or (4) the differentiated systems are based
on some different needs'of the criminal and civil justice systems, so that
resource blindness best serves the criminal system while resource
consciousness best serves the civil system.
Alternative (2) makes the most sense. The civil system's consideration of defendant resources is both sensible and superior to the criminal
system's resource-blind approach. The logic behind consideration of
defendant's net worth for punitive purposes is simple and sound.
Punitive damages are intended to punish and deter. The effectiveness of
these functions is based not on the absolute quantity of punitive
damages, but rather on the quantity of punitive damages relative to the
financial strength of the defendant." 1 A poor defendant is threatened
and harmed by the assessment of a relatively small punitive damage
award that would have little impact on a person or company with greater
resources.262 For example, $50,000 in punitive damages might cost an
individual of modest means to lose her home or business-a compelling
consequence that effectively punishes past acts and shapes future
behavior. In contrast, a Fortune 500 corporation would be impervious to
the same assessment. Its punitive and deterrent effects would be
inconsequential because the company could bear such a loss with only
the most negligible ramifications.
Net worth also is a reasonable factor for evaluating the possible
excessiveness of a punitive damage award. As one judge has observed,
"an award should not be so high as to result in the financial ruin of the
defendant."'63 Moreover, "it [should not] constitute a disproportionately large percentage of a defendant's net worth. ' '2' Both of these assertions are sensible, especially if their logic is tempered by considerations
of other relevant factors such as the egregiousness of the wrongdoing.
Some influential commentators have criticized the use of defendant
worth as a factor in the calculation of punitive damages, particularly in
regard to enterprise defendants. A report issued by the American Law

261. As one commentator observes, "different people may require different sanction levels
to be deterred." Stephen G. Bene, Note, Why Not Fine Attorneys?: An Economic Approach to
Lawyer Disciplinary Sanctions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 907, 929 (1991). While some of the
differences among people will be idiosyncratic, the most salient systematic difference is likely
to be tied to the variable of net worth.
262. See Gierman v. Toman, 185 A.2d 241, 245 (N.J. 1962) ("[W]hat would amount to

punishment visited upon a poor man would be a mere trifle to a man of wealth.").
263. Vasbinder v. Scott, 976 F.2d 118, 121 (2d Cir. 1992).

264. Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1997

43

Florida Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 2
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

Institute in 19912s (Report) recommends eliminating consideration of
enterprise defendants' assets from the assessment process.2 It reasons
that the stated wealth of an enterprise defendant is a variable substantially affected by the way the organization is structured, and is therefore an
inaccurate reflection of the entity's true means.267 The Report further
suggests that consideration of an enterprise's worth may be prejudicial
to large corporate entities, under the theory that such entities "incur
proportionately more instances of wrongdoing simply because of their
greater volume of business."2 Moreover, the report notes that punitive
damages enhanced to reflect enterprise wealth are borne ultimately by
innocent parties of modest means, such as employees, customers, and
shareholders.269
The Report's reasoning is unpersuasive. While differences in
corporate structuring certainly can affect the accuracy of inferring true
wealth from the assets listed on a balance sheet, it is reasonable to begin
with the assumption that a company's assets serve at least as a rough
proxy for its wealth.270 This presumption can and should be subject to
evidence that the connection between assets and wealth is attenuated in
a particular case. Provided that assessments of financial strength are not
limited exclusively to net worth, so that other forms of evidence that
help clarify the relationship between assets and true wealth are
" ' the accuracy critique is exaggerated.
admissible or even mandated,27
Additionally, the Report's observation regarding disproportionality
of enterprise wrongdoing is irrational. There is no reason to believe that
increased volume of business creates a disproportionate increase in
wrongdoing. Rather, as the Report itself notes, increased volume of

265. 2 A.L.I.

REPORTERS' STUDY ON ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY:

(1991).
266. Id. at 254-55.
267. Id. at 254.
268. Id. at 254-55.
269. Id. at 255.
270. Indeed, pertaining to the insurance industry, the IRS defines assets as "all of the
company's wealth." INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE MANUAL HANDBOOK HB 4232.1(10). Cf.
Note, Class Actions for Punitive Damages, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1787, 1795 (1983) (noting
evidence detailing defendant's assets can lead jury to render appropriate award).
271. Of course, the critique of using net worth to assess punitive damages does raise
important concerns if net worth provides the only data regarding the impact an award is likely
to have on a defendant. And it remains possible that other indicators may be proven to reflect
defendant wherewithal more accurately than net worth. If so, these can be built into models that
can be used as better proxies. For example, Schilit describes an economic model based largely
on cash flow analysis that could either substitute or supplement net worth assessments. See
generally Howard M. Schilit, A Model to Assess the Economic Consequences of Punitive
Damages, 14 J. PROD. LIAB. 265 (1992).
APPROACHES TO LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
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business should create aproportionateincrease in wrongdoing, assuming
that two companies are morally comparable. Indeed, any
disproportionality of wrongdoing among the larger of the comparison
companies would suggest that the company is more culpable than the
smaller company. The very use of proportionality instead of absolute
measures permits us to make fair comparisons among entities of
different sizes.2' Moreover, since the purpose of considering net worth
is to fashion punitive damages that are capable of truly punishing, the
entire issue of proportionality is a red herring.
Finally, the Report argues that the little people who own, work for,
and purchase from corporations will be harmed by punitive damages
enhanced to account for corporate worth.2' This observation is both
inaccurate and irrelevant. It is inaccurate because it makes assumptions
that can be false-for example, the assumption that a company will be
able to pass the costs of punitive damage awards on to customers,274
or the assumption that shareholders will suffer from large punitive
damage awards.275 One of the statement's implications-that little people
suffer inordinately from corporate-sized
punitive damage
awards-likewise may be inaccurate, presuming that the per capita
impact on the many individuals affected is not exorbitant or excessive.276

272. Businesses themselves understand this basic premise and build it into their financial
analysis. Vertical or common size analysis permits companies to view various financial measures
as a percentage of a total-for example, income as a percentage of sales revenues, or "return
on sales." This in turn facilitates comparisons of companies of different sizes, by rendering
various measures proportional. The basic premise behind vertical financial analysis applies to
comparisons of corporate wrongdoing. Just as equally profitable companies would evince
identical returns on sales, so equally culpable companies would tend to have identical ratios of
wrongdoings-to-size.
273. See supra text accompanying note 269.
274. The idea that corporations readily can pass the costs of large punitive damage awards
to customers in the form of higher prices is simplistic. It ignores the realities of supply and
demand in competitive markets, where the seller's ability to raise prices is always checked by
the buyer's ability to find alternative sources of supply.
275. The notion that shareholders ultimately pay for large punitive damage awards can be
inaccurate on a number of levels. Shareholder value is a complex goal that is a function of many
elements that may or may not be affected by a large punitive damage award. For example,
whether stock prices suffer as a result of punitive damage awards can depend on amount and
nature of publicity and the spins that public relations specialists can place on events. Moreover,
if large punitive damage awards serve their intended function and improve management's
exercise of care, later abuses and wrongs may be averted so that the punitive damage award
ultimately benefits both the company and its shareholders.
276. Consider the case in which punitive damages do incur costs against purchasers in the
form of price hikes or against shareholders in the form of stock devaluation or dividend
shrinkage. The effects will be negligible, and certainly justifiable in view of the goals of punitive
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The "little people" critique is irrelevant because, both legally and
functionally, corporations are entities, and as such their behaviors can
and will be shaped and altered by punishments that fit the size and
means of the entity. That owners and other stakeholders of the entity
may be average individuals should be viewed as an incidental, secondary concern. To treat large organizations as if they are identical with the
smaller persons and entities that own them would lead to a world of
corporate unaccountability, based on a convenient but misplaced
populism that denies the size, power and influence of the private firm
in modem society.
D. Punitive Damages as a Multiple of CompensatoryDamages
A common method of assessing punitive damages is to multiply
compensatory damages by some factor." This model forms the basis
of federal and state statutory provisions that permit treble damages in
the areas of antitrust, racketeering, patent infringement, and unfair trade
practices." Treble damages are calculated by tripling the actual
damage-in effect, tendering the plaintiff compensatory damages plus
the same sum two times over again.279 While treble damages are the
common statutory prototype, punitive damages obviously can be
assessed using any other factor, such as two (yielding double damages)
or four (yielding quadruple damages). What distinguishes treble or other
multiple damages from more generic punitive damages is a precise,
statutorily preordained arithmetic mode of assessment."'
Calculating punitive damages as a multiple of compensatory damages
suggests some relationship between the two. This relationship is
spurious28 because compensatory damages and punitive damages are
damages, when large costs are spread over so many consumers or shareholders that the impact
per person is slight.
277. See Sandra N. Hurd & Frances E. Zollers, State Punitive Damages Statutes: A
ProposedAlternative, 20 J. LEGIS. 191, 200 (1994) (discussing punitive damages as multiple of
compensatory damages).
278. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-1.1, -16 (1994).
279. See Barbara Shander, Punitive Damages-Addressingthe Constitutionalityof Punitive
Damages in the Third Circuit, Dunn v. Hovic (1993), 39 VILL. L. REv. 1105, 1108 (1994).
280. Otherwise, treble and punitive damages serve the same functions. The primary
purposes of each are retribution and deterrence. David A. Nelson, Comment, Attorney-Client
Privilege and ProceduralSafeguards:Are They Worth the Costs?, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 368, 395

(1992).
281. See People ex rel. Fahner v. Climatemp, Inc., 428 N.E.2d 1096, 1098 (Ill. App. Ct.
1981) ("Since 'actual damages' are intended to make the plaintiff whole, any multiplication of
the amount of actual damages serves to increase the award beyond the merely compensatory.");
Edward D. Cavanagh, DetreblingAntitrust Damages:An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 61 TUL.
L. REV. 777, 794 (1987) ("TIThe penal portion of treble damages, in dollar terms, bears no
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intended to achieve entirely distinct ends.2" Compensatory damages
redress the plaintiff's loss, whereas punitive damages punish and deter
particular defendant behaviors.283 The amount of compensatory damages necessary to render a plaintiff whole again is determined by
considering a number of factors that bear no logical connection to the
culpability of the defendant. In tort actions, compensatory damages may
be measured in terms of loss of wages, health care and hospitalization
costs, pain and suffering, and the like.2 ' In contract actions, compensatory damages ordinarily are calculated as the amount necessary to
place the plaintiff in the position she would have occupied had the
contract terms been fulfilled." 5 By what stretch of logic do these
considerations, valid and rational when the goal is to compensate a
plaintiff, bear any relationship to the assessment of appropriate, effective
penalties and deterrents? 6
necessary relation to economic harm imposed. ."); Judge Denies JNOV Motion After $19
Million Award in Bendectin Action, MEALEY'S LITIGATION REPORTS: DRUGS & MEDICAL
DEVICES, Jan. 10, 1997, available in WESTLAW, 2 No. I MLRDMD 4 (noting court's
observation that it is "'well established' that the reasonableness of a punitive award is not
evaluated in relation to a compensatory award").
282. Of course, this statement becomes inaccurate if supplementary compensation is
considered a legitimate end of punitive damages. Because compensatory functions of punitive
damages have been rejected in Part III(C), punitive and compensatory damages can be
considered to serve discrete functions for the purposes of this article.
283. According to Hurd and Zollers, confusion of these two functions "works great
mischief." Hurd & Zollers, supra note 277, at 200.
284. Joseph M. Dodge, Taxes and Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 143, 145 (1992).
285. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 (noting purpose of contract
remedies to protect promisee's "'expectation interest' ... in having the benefit of his bargain
by being put in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract been performed .... "); John A. Sebert, Jr., Punitive and NonpecuniaryDamages in Actions Based Upon
Contract:TowardAchieving the Objective of Full Compensation, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1565, 1565
(1986) ("The stated objective of contract remedies is to compensate the aggrieved party fully
for breach by putting her as closely as possible in the same position as she would have been had
the contract been performed.").
286. Related to the use of compensatory damage multipliers is any less formalized system
that uses compensatory damages loosely as a determinant or a factor in assessing punitive
damages. This process is largely comparable to the use of multipliers because it retains the
irrational connection between the plaintiff's injuries and the defendant's penalty. Accordingly,
using compensatory damages as an aspecific consideration in fixing punitive damages is no more
defensible than the more explicit use of specific multipliers. The only difference between the
two practices lies in the rigidity of multipliers. Since they establish a uniform formula to be
applied across differing cases, multipliers add a layer of arbitrariness that can be averted with
more flexible systems that use compensatory damages as a guideline. These flexible systems are
less rigid in two ways-first, they allow ratios between compensatory and punitive damages to
vary, presumably based on differences among cases; second, they allow other factors to temper
the use of compensatory damages in establishing punitive damages, permitting more defensible
factors to improve ultimate results. Thus the Supreme Court of New Jersey has noted that
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Given the different functions they serve, we should expect the
relationship between punitive and compensatory damages to be highly
variable under rational calculations. Justifiable disproportionality
between punitive and compensatory damages should exist, for example,
when injuries are minor but conduct is especially severe, or occurs
repeatedly, or has the potential to yield extensive harm." 7 These latter
factors, which should be considered in meeting reasonable punishments,
have no systematic relationship to injuries suffered. Accordingly,
discrepenaices between compensatory and punitive damages should be
seen as normal rather than troublesome.
If a nexus between compensatory damage and punitive damage
amounts is spurious, then ratios of the two forms of damages should
vary. Consider the example of two defendants in two separate suits,
indistinguishable on all grounds except the injuries the plaintiff happens
to have suffered. This hypothetical could exist, for example, if the only
difference between two lawsuits is that Plaintiff A is a normal plaintiff
and plaintiff B is an eggshell-skull plaintiff.288 Because of Plaintiff B's
particular vulnerability, her injuries are ten times greater than Plaintiff
A's injuries. Health treatment, hospitalization, and lost wages for B total
$1 million, and for A total $100,000. Under the doctrine of the eggshell
skull plaintiff, higher compensatory damages will be granted to plaintiff
serious injuries she sustained,
B to compensate her for the 2 relatively
9
sensitivity.
peculiar
her
given
Assume that the defendants' wrongful acts in the two cases are
absolutely indistinguishable, in each instance evincing exactly the same
degree of malice and gross negligence. If a multiplier is used to
calculate the punitive damages, the punishments in cases A and B will
be grossly disparate, despite identical patterns of culpability. If treble

punitive damages should be reasonably related to the injury and its cause, but that this does not
logically "call for a fixed ratio between compensatory and punitive damages awarded."
Leimgruber v. Claridge Assoc. Ltd., 375 A.2d 652, 656 (N.J. 1977).
287. See Denise M. Barton, The Evolution of Punitive Damage Awards in Securities
Arbitration: Has the Use of Punitive Damages Rendered the Arbitration Forum Inequitable?,
70 TUL. L. REV. 1537, 1558 (1996) ("[C]ourts may uphold a large punitive damage award for
the following reasons: the action of the defendant was repeated conduct or part of a larger
scheme [or] ... the harm suffered.., could potentially harm a large population .... ).
288. An "eggshell skull" plaintiff refers to a plaintiff who is particularly sensitive or
especially subject to manifestation of exaggerated injuries. See Woodhams v. Moore, 840 F.
Supp. 517, 519 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (referring to eggshell-skull plaintiffs who "may have a preexisting condition which makes [them] ... more susceptible to injury").
289. This result obtains because, under the doctrine of the eggshell-skull plaintiff, the
defendant takes the plaintiff as she finds her, and is responsible for all the damages she causes
through her negligence, even if the plaintiff is inordinately fragile or frail. Packard v. Whitten,
274 A.2d 169, 177-78 (Me. 1971).
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damages are assessed, for example, the punitive awards will be
$200,000 for Plaintiff A and $2 million for Plaintiff B.
On what basis can this disparity be justified? Certainly, the difference cannot be rationalized on any principled basis associated with the
notion of retribution. For example, one logical conception that operates
in the area of criminal law is that lesser wrongs should merit relatively
lesser punishments, and greater wrongs should merit relatively greater
punishments. 2" If punitive damages were fashioned to fit the infraction, we would expect identical wrongs to garner identical penalties. The
hypothetical we have just examined dramatizes the fact that multipliers
of compensatory damages yield punitive damages that have no connection to the dimension of deserts. This attenuation occurs because a
plaintiff's injuries are not systematically correlated with a defendant's
culpability. Great evils can yield insubstantial wrongs, and small evils
can wreak enormous havoc. In such a world, tying punitive damages to
the extent of injury is a poor mechanism to punish and deter.
Another logical conception of punishment is that the penalty must
hurt the defendant to act as retribution for past wrongs and a
disincentive to future wrongs."' We have seen that under this reasoning, a logical case can be made for anchoring punitive damages to the
defendant's economic wherewithal. 2" Here again, the use of compensatory damage multipliers bears no rational connection to the calculation
of punitive damages that the defendant will truly feel. Compensatory
damages, determined solely on the basis of the plaintiff's injuries, tell
us nothing about the assessment needed to have an impact on a
particular defendant.
If multipliers are ineffectual at measuring either the defendant's
deserts or the defendant's sensitivity to a given penalty, how else can
they be justified? The only remaining, logical justifications are poor
ones: that multiples of compensatory damages are expedient measures,
stable measures, or both. Statutory provision for treble or other multiple
damages is expedient because courts need not assess circumstances on
a case-by-case basis. One size fits all punitive damages situations, or at
most, two or three sizes might be created to fit a typ293 or a variety

290. See Teresa A. Pesce, Note, Defining Witness Tampering Under 18 U.S.C. Section
1512, 86 COLuM. L. REV. 1417, 1431 n.92 (1986) (noting Eighth Amendment requirement that
punishments fit wrongdoings, and H.L.A. Hart's defense of tying degree of punishment to degree
of wickedness).
291. See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
292. See supra pt. MC.
293. This scenario suggests a range of possible multipliers for a single infraction, which
imparts a limited degree of discretion to juries. For example, punitive damages can be stipulated
at between three and five times compensatory damages, inclusive.
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of types294 of situations. In either instance, economies of time and
labor are realized as judges and juries apply prefabricated formulas
without need to reflect, evaluate, examine, or think in any other way.
Use of multipliers also provides stability of measurement. Potential
violators know, at least constructively, that certain behaviors can trigger
punitive damages calculated in a predictable, established way.295 On
the positive side, this certainty could deter some people from engaging
in undesired activities. On the negative side, others may consider the
predetermined risks of violation to be either acceptably low or inherently
manageable. In these instances, the manageability of punitive damages
that are fixed by law can bear the arguably undesirable side effect of
enabling actors to assess costs and benefits of violation, and to
determine that the possible rewards more than justify the predictable
risks of bad behavior.2 6
In any event, while expediency and stability may be desirable ends
under at least some circumstances, they are unacceptable as the primary
drivers of a system for calculating punitive damages. Minor infractions
should not be over-penalized by prefabricated treble damages simply in
the interests of speed and economy. Likewise, serious violations ought
not to be under-penalized simply to keep the justice system moving
efficiently.2'

294. This scenario suggests that a range of multipliers can be stipulated for use with a
variety of different situations. For example, a multiplier of five could apply to acts the jury
concludes are extreme and outrageous, and a multiplier of three or four could apply to gross
misconduct that falls short of being extreme and outrageous. This approach obviously entails
even less discretion than the approach discussed supra note 293. Here, discretion would be
limited to juries' subjectivity in labelling the conduct. Once the conduct is labelled, the
multiplier is precisely prescribed.
295. Unlike some forms of constructive notice, the constructive notice here would likely
coincide with actual knowledge, particularly in cases involving large corporate defendants. This
result is because the use of multipliers is noted in media reports, and the awards rendered under
the formulas maintain a degree of consistency that alerts observers of typical magnitudes of
awards. Equivalency of constructive notice with actual knowledge should apply especially to
large corporate defendants, given the necessity of well-developed legal functions within such
firms.
296. Observers will vary in their beliefs of whether this phenomenon really is a problem.
Commentators from the law and economics school might suggest that calculations of social costs
and benefits are a rational component of efficient markets and yield optimal results as long as
damages are assessed to measure true social costs accurately. Critics might respond that social
cost-benefit analyses are as flawed as the results they sometimes yield, such as the manufacture
of dangerously defective Ford Pintos in the 1970s. For discussion of the Pinto case, see supra
note 174 and accompanying text.
297. The problem of over-penalization via application of fixed multipliers can be addressed
by moving to the kinds of statutory caps discussed in the next Part. Since these operate as
maxima, juries can adjust punitive damages down from the caps in order to avoid over-
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E. Subjecting Punitive Damages Calculations to the
Imposition of Statutory Caps
In the 1980s, critics of large punitive damage awards proposed the
statutory imposition of maximum awards, or caps.2 98 Some state
legislatures followed these recommendations, setting ceilings above
which punitive damages are not permitted to extend. Congress likewise
has established damage limitations provisions in specific areas, such as
employment discrimination litigation.2' In this Part, I shall refer to
such ceilings as "statutory caps."
Statutory caps on punitive damage awards take a variety of forms.
Some are absolute dollar-amount caps; other are formulated as multiples
of compensatory damage awards. 3" Absolute caps establish ceilings
that apply across all cases, or across those cases that fit into a prescribed
category. Virginia, for example, enacted legislation in the late 1980s
establishing a punitive damage award ceiling of $350,000 that applies
across all cases regardless of individual merits or idiosyncracies. °' In
other states, such as Alabama,3' 2 absolute caps apply in the absence of
aggravating circumstances. Alabama caps punitive damages at $250,000
unless there has been malice, defamation, or a pattern of intentional
wrongful acts.'
Multiple or ratio caps limit punitive damage awards to some multiple
of the compensatory damage award.'" The multiples used by states
employing ratio caps vary, as do the particular rules specifying how and

penalization. Obviously, the problem of under-penalization is not alleviated by replacing fixed
multipliers with statutory caps, since either can limit punishment of particularly egregious
infractions to unacceptably low levels.
298. See Ronald Brownstein, Domestic Policy Council Sprints to Liability Insurance
Decision, NAT'L J., June 28, 1986, at 1585 (noting 1986 proposal to cap punitive damages, made
by Domestic Policy Council's Tort Policy Working Group).
299. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b)(3)(A)-(D) (1997) (capping compensatory and punitive

damages in applicable discrimination cases at various stages from $50,000 to $300,000,
depending on size of employer). For discussion generally, see R. Slaton Tuggle III, EEOC
Policy Guidanceon Compensatoryand PunitiveDamages, EMPLOY. REL. TODAY, Autumn 1992,

at 327.
A congressional attempt to limit product liability awards through the Common Sense Product
Liability Legal Reform Act of 1996 was thwarted by President Clinton's veto. Christine
D'Ambrosia, Punitive Damages in Light of BMW of North America, Inc., v. Gore: A Cry for
State Sovereignty, 5 J.L. & POL'Y 577, 577-78 (1997).
300. Developments in the Law-The Civil Jury: Jury Determinationof Punitive Damages,
110 HARV. L. REV. 1513, 1533 (1997) [hereinafter Jury Determination].
301. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (1987).
302. ALA. CODE § 6-11-21 (1993).

303. Id.
304. See Jury Determination, supra note 300, at 1533.
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under what circumstances the multiples are to be applied. Three is a
common statutory multiple cap. 5 Some states adopt a hybrid absolute-ratio cap, limiting punitive damages to the higher of either an
absolute ceiling or a "compensatory damage multiple" ceiling. New
Jersey, for instance, adopted legislation in 1995 that limits punitive
damages to the greater of five times compensatory damages or
$350,000, except for specified classes of infractions such as discrimination and sexual abuse. 6
Proponents defend the adoption of statutory caps as a remedy for a
number of the ills of an overly litigious society that may threaten the
viability of businesses and the economy those businesses support. They
suggest that without caps, juries can and do render excessive awards'
that expose businesses to undue volatility"1 and unjustifiable risk"
at best, and potential financial ruin at worst.1
Opponents are moving to eliminate some of the statutory caps that
have been enacted since the 1970s."' They suggest that statutory caps
undermine the deterrence function of punitive damages. 2 This
argument suggests that defendants calculate the moderate, predictable
costs of fiat caps and incorporate them into their budgets and activities. 3 Viewed most cynically, companies operating under this scenario
305. For statutes employing some form of treble damage cap, see, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 13-21-102(1)(a), (3) (1996) (permitting juries to assess exemplary damages equal to
compensatory damages and permitting courts to increase exemplary damage awards to a
maximum of three times compensatory damages); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42.005(1)(a) (Michie
Supp. 1995) (limiting exemplary and punitive damage awards to three times compensatory
damages when compensatory damages total or exceed $100,000).
306. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.14.
307. David G. Owen, Deterrenceand Desert in Tort: A Comment, 73 CAL L. REV. 665,
672 (1985).
308. Toy, supra note 170, at 323.
309. See Peter Kinzler, Recent Studies of Punitive Damage Awards: The Tale of the Tape,
15 J. INS. REG. 402 (1997) (citing businesses diverting funds from innovation to avert liability
risk).
310. See Judith Camile Glasscock, Comment, Emptying the Deep Pocket in Mass Tort
Litigation, 18 ST. MARY'S L.J. 977, 994 (1987) (noting "possibility of financial ruin faced by
manufacturers threatened with multiple punitive awards").
311. See, e.g., Joan R. Rose, Would the Demise of Caps on Damages Treble Premiums?,
MED. ECON., May 12, 1997, at 37 (discussing bills before California legislature to waive certain
statutory caps established under state's Medical Insurance Compensation Reform Act of 1975).
312. See Andrea A. Curcio, Painful Publicity-An Alternative Punitive Damage Sanction,
45 DEPAUL L. REV. 341, 355 (1996) ("Opponents of punitive damage limits argue that the limits
lead to a decline in corporate responsibility for consumer safety."); Allison D. Johnson, Note,
Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange and the Utah Punitive Damage Act: Toward a Sounder
Law of Punitive Damages?, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 513, 525 (suggesting rigid caps undermine
deterrence function).
313. See Hallahan, supra note 87, at 443 ("One common challenge to statutory restrictions
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decline to curb dangerous or irresponsible activities, passing the
predictable, contained, and therefore highly manageable cost of those
activities to customers who then effectively underwrite insurance for the
company's wrongdoings. Statutory caps arguably facilitate this process
by keeping punitive damage costs small enough that they can be
absorbed in relatively moderate price increases." 4 Indeed, for very
wealthy defendants, flat caps may eliminate entirely any possible
deterrent effect of punitive damages, no matter how egregious the wrong
being punished." 5
These arguments for and against statutory caps are consistent with
each other, and are derived alike from a single, basic premise-that
uncapped punitive damages can seriously hurt a defendant. The policy
direction to which this observation leads depends mostly on perspective.
Those who sympathize with the survival needs of businesses see the
pain inflicted by punitive damages as threatening. 1 6 Those who
sympathize with plaintiff victims see this same pain as beneficent in the
retribution and deterrence functions it supports. 3 7 Because the utility
of uncapped punitive damages hinges largely on a commentator's
allegiances, we must get beyond effects to evaluate caps fairly. In an
attempt to infuse subjective assessments with some objectivity, we
should examine whether statutory caps seem reasonable or logical, given
the ends we have already determined to be legitimate goals for punitive
damages to serve.
Viewed objectively, statutory caps make little sense. Applying some
multiple of compensatory damages as a punitive damages cap bears the
contends that defendants simply calculate the flat caps into the costs of their actions,
undermining the award's deterrent effect as well as decreasing safety standards.").
314. In other words, a business's ability to pass punitive damage expenses to customers
depends on how much extra cost is being shared among how many customers. With caps

presently set at around three to five times compensatory damages according to state variations,
capped awards may be so small as to serve no deterrent effect. Conversely, at some point, an
uncapped award will be too large to build into prices without harmfully undermining market
share. This result will obtain whenever the cost of business lost by passing punitive damage
expenses to customers outweighs the cost of remedying the wrong underlying the assessment of
the punitive damages.
315. See David C. Berry, Comment, Untwisting New Jersey's Cap on Punitive Damages,
27 SETON HALL L. REv. 167, 195-96 (1996) (recognizing caps' potential to eliminate jurys'
ability to create truly deterrent punitive damage awards against wealthy defendants).
316. See, e.g., Hearing of Senate Judiciary Committee: Punitive Damages in Financial
Injury Cases, June 24, 1997, availablein LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File (citing concern of
Senator Charles R. Grassley (R-IA) that high punitive damages can threaten survival of small
businesses).
317. See, e.g., Alabama Holds Session for Tort Reform, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 22, 1996, at A8
(noting Alabama Trial Lawyers Association's opposition to tort reform bill because uncapped
punitive damages necessary to thwart corporate misdeeds).
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same shortcomings as using such multiples to determine punitive
damages, as discussed in the preceding Part. While the goal of ensuring
reasonableness of punitive damages is laudable, this end bears no logical
proportional relationship to the amount of the compensatory damages
award. Again, the difficulty in tying these two categories together rests
in the basic difference in the functions of compensatory and punitive
damages.318 The amount needed to punish the wrongdoer, and to deter
future wrongdoings by the defendant and others, will be related to a
number of variables. These logically would include the severity of the
wrongful act, the perceived fit between the act and the punishment, and
the impact the punishment has on the particular defendant's finances.
They would not include the extent of injury the plaintiff happens to
suffer. Accordingly, statutory caps are an arbitrary mechanism for
containing punitive damage awards. They are no more supportable than
the compensatory damage multipliers rejected earlier.
V. CONCLUSION

The preceding Part found substantial variation in the validity of
factors used to assess punitive damages. The merits of each factor were
evaluated by examining how effectively its use fosters legitimate rather
than indefensible policy ends of punitive damages, as rated in Part II.
Specifically, the classic ends of retribution and deterrence were viewed
as the most important goals; maintenance of a corps of private litigants
for the furtherance of justice was considered an important ancillary end;
and supplementation of compensatory awards to reimburse plaintiffs
more accurately for their true losses was seen as an indefensible end.
In terms of their ability to enhance the aforementioned legitimate
goals and not the inappropriate supplemental compensation goal, two
factors rank highest-calculation of punitive damages to reflect the
seriousness of an infraction, and punitive damages calculated as a
function of the economic condition of the defendant. Seriousness of
infraction has the clearest nexus to the two classical purposes of
retribution and deterrence, and is consistent with the empowerment of
supplemental attorneys general who can further the two classical ends.
The economic condition of the defendant is a consideration that can help
fine-tune the effectiveness of penalties so they can achieve the two
classic goals with material impact. Consideration of defendant wealth as
a factor in assessing punitive damages likewise encourages litigants to
pursue their rights and thereby supplement official law enforcement
mechanisms. Finally, neither of these highest-rated factors for calculat-

318. See supra notes 281-90 and accompanying text.
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ing punitive damages bears any direct or explicit relationship to the
indefensible goal of supplementing compensatory damages.319 The
absence of a connection between the factors and the rejected compensation-augmentation goal likewise operates in the factors' favor.
Two other factors rate substantially lower in their ability to further
the legitimate ends of punitive damages. These are the use of multiples
of compensatory damages and the imposition of statutory caps. They are
grouped together in this summary evaluation Part because they bear
identical weaknesses-both factors presume a legitimate connection
between punitive damages and compensatory damages where no
defensible relationship can be found.3 The retributive and deterrence
functions of punitive damages have no systematic association with the
reimbursement of plaintiffs for the injuries they have sustained. At best,
the two principal punitive functions might be advanced randomly by
punitive damage assessments that are derived as a multiple of compensation. Accordingly, the only purpose of multiples and caps is a restraining
one-in a blunt way, they can keep juries from awarding unreasonably
high punitive damages. While this function keeps the two factors from
falling into the lowest ranking, it is but a poor justification for the
factors' use. Judicial review has served to curb outrageous jury verdicts
in the past,32 ' and remains a more appropriate mechanism towards that
end than arbitrary multiples and caps that otherwise have no logical
bearing on the most critical functions of punitive damages.
The lowest-ranked factor we have considered is supplementation of
compensation to approximate more accurately the true losses realized by
plaintiffs. The factor has no direct bearing on the most valuable
functions of punitive damages-retribution and deterrence-or even on
the ancillary function of private supplementary enforcement. The only
end to which this factor is directly linked is the insupportable end of
mitigating the ostensible harshness of a supposedly inadequate compensatory damages system. This end was rejected as an inappropriate endrun against legitimate, honest legal procedures for the alteration of
public policy. Any measurement criterion that is based on this unacceptable goal likewise must be evaluated as unacceptable.

319. The emphasis on a "direct" and "explicit" relationship here suggests that while any
measure that may yield punitive damages can inadvertently raise the payment to plaintiffs and
thereby coincidentally move compensation closer to supposedly true loss, these measures do not

in any way seek to achieve this end.
320. The relationship here is most explicit in the use of multiples, which of course directly
tie punitive damages to compensatory damages. The somewhat less explicit relationship in the
imposition of statutory caps applies when the caps are defined in terms of multiples of
compensatory damages rather than in an absolute dollar amount.
321. See supra notes 91-138 and accompanying text.
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These appraisals are not perfect. Indeed, no system of damages
attempting to moderate human behavior ever can be perfect. Instead, the
recommendations in this Article suggest an effort toward greater
rationality, to be achieved by carefully assessing the utility of punitive
damages and then modeling the rules that govern their calculation
accordingly. The further we can refine this endeavor, the better the
remedy of punitive damages can serve its reasonable public policy ends.
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